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IS THERE A PLACE FOR A REASONABLE
WOMAN IN THE LAW? A DISCUSSION OF




Sexual harassment is a recognized form of sexual discrimina-
tion actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Although this statement of the law is accurate, it is more realistic
to say that some sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.
The modifier "some" is made necessary by a basic problem plagu-
ing courts-there is no consensus on exactly what types of behav-
ior constitute sexual harassment.2 As the courts have struggled to
develop sexual harassment law, one distinct theme has emerged:
Men and women often have very different perceptions of what is
appropriate sexual conduct in the workplace and, therefore, of
what conduct is offensive or harassing.
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) established guidelines defining sexual harassment: "Un-
welcome sexual [conduct] constitute[s] sexual harassment when ...
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
t I would like to thank Sara Emley for her significant editorial contribution to this
Note and for her friendship.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
2. Two often cited definitions of sexual harassment are as follows: "unsolicited non-
reciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's sex role over her function as a worker,"
LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOwN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB
14, 15 (1978); and "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power," explained in CATHARINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979). Other organiza-
tions such as the National Organization for Women and the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) have promulgated more gender-neutral definitions of sexual
harassment. See Ellen F. Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 333-35 (1990).
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with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment. '3 The guidelines seem
to suggest that some incidents of unwelcome sexual conduct in the
workplace may not "unreasonably" interfere with a person's work
performance and may not create a hostile working environment.4
Thus, according to the EEOC guidelines, only some forms of
unwelcome sexual conduct are actionable as harassment under
Title VII. Other incidents must, by negative implication, be consid-
ered "reasonable" interference It is the author's position that all
unwelcome sexual conduct within the context of the working envi-
ronment constitutes, per se, unreasonable interference with a
victim's ability to perform, and thus, should be considered sexual
3. In full, the EEOC guidelines read as follows:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Un-
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physi-
cal conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individu-
al, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992) (footnote omitted).
4. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions,
13 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 35, 48 (1990). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of this issue in Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), see infra text
accompanying notes 19-22.
5. Implicitly, the "reasonable" interference caused by the unwelcome sexual conduct
is behavior that a woman might expect in a workplace containing both men and women.
These not "unreasonable" interferences are not actionable in a court of law.
Next Fall, a woman's right to be free from unreasonable interference in the
workplace may be greatly reduced. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case
dealing with hostile environment sexual harassment, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 23779, cert. granted, 61 US.L.W. 3596 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1993) (No.
92-1168), to decide the following issue: "whether women employees must prove that they
suffered severe psychological injury-as opposed to being merely offended-to win sexual-
harassment lawsuits." Paul M. Barrett, Justices to Decide If Women Must Prove Psycho-
logical Injury of Sex Harassment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1993, at A4.
Severe psychological injury should not be required as proof of unreasonable inter-
ference with an individual's work performance. Nor should it be required to establish an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. If the Supreme Court chooses to
limit its Meritor holding in this way, explicit guidelines concerning what constitutes a
severe psychological injury as well as an admonition about the crucial role that percep-
tion differences may play in these cases should accompany the decision. An opinion
requiring proof of severe psychological injury, particularly in the context of the societal
problems addressed throughout this Note, has the power to circumscribe greatly the abili-
ty and right of a woman to, work in an environment free from discrimination, harass-
ment, and offensive sexual conduct-a right currently protected under Title VII.
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harassment.6 The division of instances of sexual harassment into
actionable and non-actionable categories gives rise to related ques-
tions: What types of harassment "unreasonably" interfere with a
victim's ability to perform her job? What constitutes a reasonable
understanding of "offensive" behavior? And, finally, who decides?
Traditionally, courts have employed the "reasonable person"
test to determine what constitutes unreasonable harassment.7 Re-
cently, however, several courts have adopted a "reasonable wom-
an" standard, affirming two popular notions: Women and men
perceive instances of sexual conduct in the workplace differently;
and sexual conduct has very different implications and consequenc-
es for women than it dbes for men. Proponents of the "reasonable
woman" standard maintain that the failure to acknowledge judi-
cially both the differences between men and women and the rea-
sons for those differences will prevent women from receiving pro-
tection under Title VII.
There is no doubt that the explicit and conscientious acknowl-
edgement of women's heightened sensitivities to sexual conduct in
the workplace can benefit individual plaintiffs in the short-term.
Although arguably an improvement over the ostensibly gender-
neutral reasonable person standard, the proposed reasonable wom-
an standard has definitional, theoretical, and practical drawbacks,
as well as negative long-term consequences. Definitionally speak-
ing, if the reasonable man is the businessman in shirt-sleeves who
mows his own lawn and "takes the magazines at home," who is
the archetypal reasonable woman?8 As a theoretical matter, en-
6. ,Throughout this Note, I will use the term "sexual harassment" to refer to unwel-
come sexual conduct in the workplace. Although not all of the behavior discussed quali-
fies as harassment under the EEOC guidelines, I believe this use of the term is more in
line with its common meaning.
7. It may be more accurate to say that the "reasonable man" was the model for
the traditional legal standard, but the gender-neutral "reasonable person" terminology has
acquired more popularity in recent years. The Supreme Court recognized sexual harass-
ment as an actionable claim in 1986. By then, the term "reasonable person" had largely
replaced the term "reasonable man." Critics argue that the "reasonable person" is gen-
der-neutral in name only, in that the actual concept has not evolved along with the ter-
minology. In her discussion of the problems posed by the "looseness of legal language,"
Naomi Cahn notes that "courts have articulated, as at least a cosmetic improvement, a
reasonable person standard. In application, however, little but the male language of the
standard has changed." Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reason-
able Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1405 (1992)
(footnotes omitted).
8. Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts
856 [Vol. 42:854
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coding a reasonable woman as an entity fundamentally distinct
from a reasonable man or reasonable person marginalizes women
and is therefore a dangerous reform. Furthermore, its implementa-
tion poses the risk of reifying the very differences that ostensibly
cause the problems we are working to eradicate. As a practical
matter, at least one district court opinion has demonstrated that
the point of view of the "average female employee" can produce
results as disastrous for the plaintiff as any that may result from
the application of the reasonable person standard.' Finally, a gen-
der-specific legal standard creates a negative long-term conse-
quence: It works against the viable goal of creating a standard of
professional conduct in the workplace that is mutually acceptable
to both men and women.
Some courts that have established and adhered to the reason-
able woman standard have used it interchangeably with a related
standard based on the perspective of the reasonable victim. Be-
cause women comprise the majority of victims of sexual harass-
ment, it is not surprising that these two terms are conflated. Se-
mantically and theoretically, however, a reasonable victim and a
reasonable woman are two very different people; standards of
evaluation named after each entail very different implications and
consequences for women. All women are not victims, and all vic-
tims are not women. Using the terms "woman" and "victim" inter-
changeably induces these misconceptions detrimental both to
society's view of women and to women's view of themselves.
Sexual harassment law is changing as the issues of perception
and power presented by individual cases of harassment and the
larger societal phenomenon gain public attention. To avoid the
problems posed by both the reasonable person and the reasonable
woman standards, courts should adopt a reasonable victim stan-
dard and explicitly acknowledge gender as a primary criterion of
evaluation on a case-by-case basis. This solution focuses the issue
on the power differential between victim and perpetrator rather
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 58 (1989); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS,
BELiEFS, ATrIUDES AND THE LAw 23 (1985) (reviewing the historical conceptualizations
of the reasonably prudent man); Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man
in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REV. 1, 2 (1951) (examining the moral qualities, judg-
ment, knowledge, experience, perception of risk, skill, age, sanity, as well as physical,
mental, and emotional characteristics of the reasonable man).
9. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd,
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); see infra Section III(A).
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than on the gender differential that the reasonable woman stan-
dard emphasizes. At the same time, it requires courts to make an
explicit and deliberate assessment of the harms specific to the
cases in which the victims are women. Gender is an inherently
power-related concept in a patriarchally structured society. Al-
though the power exercised by an employer over an employee is
the prominent issue in many of these cases, a fact-specific gender
analysis will reveal the additional power dynamic inherent in a
relationship between a male harasser and a female victim, and will
therefore be crucial to equitable determinations."0 Further, the
status and relationship of victims and perpetrators is fairly stable
and unchanging over time, unlike the relationship between men
and women in society. A reasonable victim standard will be more
flexible in the long run, allowing society to progress steadily to-
ward a mutually acceptable standard of professional conduct with-
out radically altering sexual harassment law as each change is
made.
After a brief history of the relevant sexual harassment law in
Part I, Part II of this Note explores some of the ways in which
men's and women's different perceptions of appropriate sexual
conduct have begun to play a role in the formulation and applica-
tion of the relevant legal standards in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases. This Part also discusses popular perceptions of
sexual conduct, the power dynamics inherent in harassment situa-
tions involving male perpetrators and female victims, and the
cultural gender stereotypes that inform both the perceptions and
the power imbalance characteristic of sexual harassment situations.
Part III demonstrates how the reasonable woman standard, as
formulated by the Ninth Circuit in the recent case of Ellison v.
Brady," produces more equitable results for the plaintiff than the
traditional reasonable person standard as employed in the infa-
10. The power of the employer over the employee referred to here applies both
when the employer is the actual harasser and when the employer is merely insensitive to
or passive in response to a victim's complaints. Many sexual harassment claims will in-
volve sexual conduct imposed on a woman by a co-worker rather than by an employer.
In these cases, the gender of the harasser and the employer will be relevant consider-
ations, as will the power dynamic between the employer, who has the power to change
the situation, and the employee. The reasonable victim standard, as explained in Part V,
can accommodate any of the various combinations of power and gender within a given
sexual harassment scenario.
11. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 42:854
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mous Sixth Circuit decision Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co."
Despite the potential benefits of the reasonable woman standard
illuminated by the Ellison court, Part IV discusses the definitional,
theoretical, and practical problems with this standard. This Part
analyzes the ways in which a separate reasonableness standard can
marginalize women as a group and reify the socialized differences
that cause the problems the standard seeks to eradicate. It also
explores the practical implementation of the suggested standard by
examining one instance in which the reasonable woman standard
did not produce the expected results. Finally, Part V examines the
proposed reasonable victim standard coupled with an explicit gen-
der analysis as an alternative to both the traditional and emerging
standards of evaluation. Although proponents of the reasonable
woman standard have used the perception gap problem to justify
their proposed modification, the reasonable victim standard de-
scribed in this Note can accommodate this problem adequately.
The proposed reasonable victim standard includes an explicit ac-
knowledgement of societal and workplace gender dynamics on a
case-by-case basis when applicable. Essentially, both the reasonable
woman and the reasonable victim standards provide an adequate
response to the perception problem, and in the context of this re-
sponse, both standards are susceptible to judicial bias. The reason-
able victim standard, however, poses less of a problem regarding
judicial bias because it is more narrowly tailored to the specific
plaintiff. Furthermore, it is not accompanied by the negative long-
term consequences that accompany the adoption of the reasonable
woman standard.
I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Sexual harassment was recognized as a legitimate cause of
action under Title VII in 1976.13 In 1980, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated a set of guidelines
defining sexual harassment.14 Although the EEOC guidelines do
not have the effect of law,' courts have explicitly relied on them
12. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
13. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing sexual ha-
rassment as treatment "based on sex" within the meaning of. Title VII), rev'd on other
grounds sub nora. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991). For the text of the guidelines, see supra note 3.
15. For a discussion of administrative deference to EEOC guidelines in the context
1993]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
in sexual harassment decisions.16 Both the guidelines and the
courts acknowledge two categories of sexual harassment claims:
quid pro quo .and hostile environment violations."7 Quid pro quo
harassment is a contemplated exchange of an employment benefit
for a sexual favor: e.g., "If you sleep with me, I'll make sure you
get promoted." Because these incidents usually result in some kind
of economic or tangible harm to the victim, courts have been
more receptive to plaintiffs bringing quid pro quo harassment
claims than to plaintiffs bringing hostile environment claims. In
order to succeed on a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must
show that unwelcome sexual conduct is sufficiently severe or per-
vasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment, and that
this conduct creates an abusive working environment. 8
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as
a form of sexual discrimination actionable under Title VII. In
MeNtor Savings Bank v. Vinson,"9 the Supreme Court found that
Mechelle Vinson's working environment could be considered hos-
tile by a trier of fact because she testified that her employer "fon-
dled her in front of other employees, followed her into the
women's rest room when she went there alone, exposed himself to
her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions."2 The
Meitor Court thus established a helpful precedent for sexual ha-
rassment victims by explicitly recognizing the hostile environment
claim as an actionable form of sexual discrimination under Title
of extraterritorial application of Title VII, see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct.
1227 (1991).
16. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
17. Quid pro quo violations are covered by subsections (1) and (2) of 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a). Hostile environment claims fall under subsection (3).
18. Although the guidelines use the disjunctive connector "or" at 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a)(3), the Supreme Court has substituted the word "and" in a seminal decision
regarding hostile environment sexual harassment: "For sexual harassment to be actionable,
it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment."' Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 89, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added). This
interpretation of Title VII effectively requires the plaintiff to demonstrate both unreason-
able interference with work and an abusive environment.
19. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
20. Id. at 60. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consis-
tent with its opinion.
[Vol. 42:854
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VII.2' The Court also interpreted the language of Title VII to
prohibit non-economic and nontangible discrimination.°
Meitor has also proven detrimental to victims" because its
standard leaves lower courts with considerable leeway and discre-
tion in cases that turn primarily on questions of the credibility of
the victim and the personal bias of the factfinder 2 4 In crafting its
standard the Meritor Court relied on the EEOC guidelines, which
define harassment as unwelcome sexual conduct having "the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
working environment."'  EEOC precedent firmly establishes that
"Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."'
Meritor's standard is difficult for plaintiffs to meet, however, be-
cause the Court specifically noted that "not all workplace conduct
that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition,
or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII."'27
21. Id. at 64. The hostile environment claim was first recognized in Bundy v. Jack-
son, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). That case was followed by Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982), in which the court analogized sexual and
racial harassment: "Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment
for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality."
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
23. See David Holtzman & Eric Trelz, Recent Developments in the Law of Sexual
Harassment" Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 ST.
Louis U. L.i. 239, 240-41 (1987).
24. For example, Justice Rehnquist's treatment of the voluntariness issue proves
extremely problematic for plaintiffs.
While the question whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents
difficult problems of proof and turns largely on credibility determinations com-
mitted to the trier of fact, the District Court in this case erroneously focused
on the "voluntariness" of respondent's participation in the claimed sexual epi-
sodes. The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that
the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome ....
.. . While "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to
such a claim, it does not follow that complainant's sexually provocative speech
or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she
found particular sexual advances unwelcome.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69.
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.i1(a)(3) (1992).
26. Mefitor, 477 U.S. at 65.
27. Id. at 67; see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991) (restating
the Court's cautionary statement in Meritor). However, one commentator maintains that
the Supreme Court in Meritor accepted the approach enunciated in Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), rather than the more lenient
EEOC guidelines, choosing "to evaluate the claim not by the offender's actions, but by
19931
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"For sexual harassment to be actionable," the Court stated, "it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.'"" The conduct must also be unwelcome.29 The pliable
how much a woman can tolerate." Pollack, supra note 4, at 60. She argues that the
standard Justice Rehnquist established leaves significant room for legal sexual harassment,
barring "only the most outrageous conduct." Id. The language of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
provides support for her position. The regulation uses the disjunctive connector "or"
between the two clauses of subsection (3). See supra text accompanying note 25. In
Meritor, however, the Court required that the plaintiff establish both conduct causing
unreasonable interference with the working environment "and" an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment. 477 U.S. at 67.
28. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(11th Cir. 1982)).
29. Although the Meritor court establishes that a plaintiff's "voluntary" participation
in sex-related condtict is not the appropriate focus in a sexual harassment inquiry, the
Court leaves the victim of sexual harassment to face innumerable problems concerning
whether the conduct at issue was "welcome." The Court writes, "The correct inquiry is
whether respondent by her conduct indicated the the alleged sexual advances were unwel-
come, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary." Id. at 68.
As noted previously, Justice Rehnquist specifically mentions the complainant's manner of
dress and speech as "obviously relevant" inquiries. Id. at 69.
The Meritor standard creates a situation in which sexual conduct in the workplace
is presumptively welcomed by the recipient or target: she must show affirmatively that
the alleged sexual conduct was not welcome and that she demonstrated as much through
her dress and speech. In the Meritor opinion, Justice Rehnquist does not explicitly state
that the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the conduct was unwelcome is on the
complainant, but the language is insidious, and the message is clear. A complainant must
show that the conduct was unwelcome, i.e., that she did nothing to invite it and every-
thing possible to discourage it. Whether or not a woman "invites" sexual advances is a
question highly colored by the perspective of the participant.
One might wonder why sexual conduct in the context of the workplace, a profes-
sional environment, is not presumptively unwelcome. Under this standard, the plaintiff
would have the initial burden of establishing that conduct of a sexually offensive nature
occurred. After this conduct has been established, the burden of persuasion, not produc-
tion, should shift to the defendant to show affirmatively that the person claiming to be
harassed invited the advances or other sexual conduct at issue. Although this standard
still places the woman's manner of speech and dress on trial (because the defendant
would inevitably seek to introduce such "obviously relevant" evidence), the burden of
persuasion would be more equitably placed. Courts should interpret Title VII to protect
women from sexual harassment and create a workplace presumptively free of sexual
advances and conduct by shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show that
a female plaintiff invited the sexual conduct she has successfully established.
Opponents will argue that creating a workplace presumptively free of sexual con-
duct will chill relations between the sexes, that such a proposition seeks to create a
world without romance. In response, the workplace is a limited area, the purpose of
which is to promote a professional objective. Women have a right to work in any given
working environment without constantly negotiating sexually offensive conditions and
without monitoring their dress and speech to make sure they are exuding an appropriate
level of unwelcomeness. Finally, this allocation of burdens does not remove romance and
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language of this standard effectively has given lower courts discre-
tion to apply their own tests and develop their own interpretations
when evaluating the sufficiency, pervasiveness, and abusive quality
of offensive conduct.
The language of the guidelines is infinitely malleable, and there
is too much reliance on the good faith of the courts to interpret
the language to remedy the harm. If only "unreasonable interfer-
ence" is actionable, does this mean there is reasonable interfer-
ence? Isn't it unreasonable to ask the victim of sexual harass-
ment to tolerate any interference with her ability to perform her
job?' °
Hostile environment claims have generated a controversy among
both cir6uit and district courts regarding the reasonableness stan-
dard used in sexual harassment cases. The debate centers around
two issues: what behaviors are unreasonable, and from whose
perspective the reasonableness of the conduct is determined.
II. PERCEPTION AND POWER: CRUCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD
Consideration of the issues of perception and power is crucial
to a coherent analysis of hostile environment sexual harassment
law. Currently, a perception gap exists between men and women
regarding sexual conduct in the workplace. Their ideas regarding
what types of behavior are "reasonable" in the working environ-
ment vary dramatically. When a woman is the victim of unwel-
come sexual conduct in the workplace, a judge must consider a
dual power dynamic when applying any standard built around the
concept of reasonableness. The power dynamic must be measured
on two axes-that of employment status (employer/employee rela-
tionship) and that of gender (male/female relationship). Popular
gender stereotypes held by the men and women involved in sexual
harassment situations as well as by the judges attempting to re-
solve the ensuing legal disputes contribute to the interpretive con-
fusion enshrouding the area of sexual harassment. Before analyzing
sexual conduct from the workplace. It merely removes unwelcome conduct. A man can
still ask a co-worker for a date during working hours. If a woman felt harassed and tried
to bring a suit on the basis of one respectful request for a dinner date, she would inevi-
tably lose. If, however, the man did not accept her answer and continued to bother and
harass her, she would and should ultimately be successful in a sexual harassment suit.
30. Pollack, supra note 4, at 48.
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the caselaw, it is necessary to examine these areas of perception
and power and to consider the impact these issues may have on
the selection of an appropriate legal standard.
A. Popular Notions and the Perception Gap
When a judge decides whether a working environment is
"severe," "pervasive," and "abusive," to whose perspective should
the judge defer? Evidence of differing views concerning appropri-
ate sexual conduct and language on the parts of men and women
has led critics and courts to believe that the application of the
reasonable person standard may mask cognizable, socialized gender
differences.3' Because the reasonable person test offers an illuso-
ry, gender-neutral standard of measurement, it has resulted in the
reinforcement of the discriminatory status quo from which women
are seeking protection.32
Adopting the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable person
assumes that there is some view of sexual harassment that we are
all likely to share, once we 'set aside the overreaction of the
victim. It is a stark denial of a range of social facts that make
sexual harassment a distinctly different experience for women
than it would be for men.33
Recent scholarly articles highlight substantially different perspec-
tives among men and women on appropriate sexual conduct and
language in the workplace.
[M]uch of the behavior that women find offensive is behavior
that is accepted as normal heterosexual behavior by men. Ac-
cordingly, men have difficulty believing, or simply do not accept,
women's versions of the events. Even when women's reports are
believed, men often are unconvinced that women suffer any harm
from the offensive behavior.34
During Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas's confirmation
hearings, several newspaper articles reflected the widespread con-
31. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (1989).
32. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.'Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987). For an analysis of flaws in the reasonable person standard regard-
ing voluntariness and consent, see Mary Jo Shaney, Note, Perceptions of Harm. The
Consent Defense in Sexual Harassment Cases, 71 IOWA L REV. 1109 (1986).
33. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1201.
34. Pollack, supra note 4, at 52.
864 [Vol. 42:854
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troversy and disagreement about this perception question among
the general public.3
The controversy has developed around the following questions:
What types of behavior are offensive? What types of offensive
behavior do cause harm? Should women be required to tolerate a
minimum level of offensive sexual conduct within the working
environment? Courts faced with these questions are without sub-
stantial guidance in determining when an actual violation of Title
VII occurs. The EEOC guidelines are both precatory and scant.
The EEOC's interpretation of its guidelines, though providing
direction and guidance, is not binding on the courts.' Title VII
does not define what types of behavior are offensive or what types
of offensive behavior cause harm.37 In addition, there is
"[v]irtually no legislative history provid[ing] guidance to courts
interpreting the prohibition of sex discrimination."3
35. See Cynthia Crossen, Sex & Power in the Office: Are You from Another Planet,
or What? Men and Women Now Work Side by Side, but Still Look at Each Other with
Fear and Bewilderment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1991, at Bi; John Hernan, Harassment
Views in the Workplace, WALL ST. I., Oct. 10, 1991, at BI (reporting the opinions of
various professionals, both male and female, regarding their perceptions of the prevalence
and nature of sexual harassment in the workplace); Joann S. Lublin, Thomas Battle Spot-
lights Harassment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1991, at BI (discussing the prevalence of sexual
harassment and differing perceptions of men and women).
36. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235 (1991); see also Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 71 (1986).
37. The text of Title VII merely provides a general guideline that
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
38. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at
64. The category "sex" was added to Title VII 'at the last minute, allegedly to defeat the
bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. "The amendment was added by an
opponent of the act [Representative Howard Smith] who intended thereby to torpedo the
entire business." Paul, supra note 2, at 339. "One Congresswoman commented that most
people who opposed the Civil Rights bill were the strongest advocates of the amendment
to include sex and that the intent of the sponsor was to enlist additional opposition to
Title VII. These allegations were denied by the amendment's sponsor." Barbara L.
Zalucki, Discrimination Law-Defining the Hostile Work Environment Claim of Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 11 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 143, 147 n.23 (1989).
This Court-like all Title VII enthusiasts-is well aware that the sex discrimina-
tion prohibition was added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil rights
opponent Howard W. Smith. But the joke backfired on Smith when the amend-
ment was adopted on the floor of the House under the House five-minute rule.
While sex discrimination thus was not even close to being a major con-
cern of the original drafters of Title VII, it cannot be denied that sex discrimi-
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Furthermore, the way that Title VII has been used by women
in the past does not provide a context from which courts can draw
a coherent theory for application in sexual harassment cases. Ini-
tially, women used Title VII to gain access to traditionally male-
dominated workplaces. Title VII advocates argued that if there
were no qualitative differences between men's and women's abili-
ties to perform, hiring and promotion standards should be gender-
blind.39 Currently, plaintiffs attempt to use this same section of
the Civil Rights Act to ensure equal treatment after they have
gained access to male-dominated working environments. In the
sexual harassment context, many claim that there are fundamental
differences in the socialization processes of men and women, and
that Title VII should be used to address these differences.' The
theory underpinning the legal argument has evolved from "Women
are the same, treat us equally" to "Women are different, treat us
fairly."
Advocates of this "difference approach" argue that these
different socialization processes lead to the differences in the ways
men and women perceive sexual conduct in the workplace. They
draw support from the differences in perception evidenced by men
and women in everyday situations in which harassment often be-
comes an issue.
There is less popular agreement among men and women re-
garding milder examples of harassment than concerning more ex-
nation was indeed very important to the 1972 and 1978 amendments to Title
VII. Therefore, it is entirely correct to conclude that Title VII-as it now
stands-reflects a deep commitment to the eradication of gender based discrimi-
nation.
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (citations
omitted), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); see also
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986); 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964)
(recounting the debate regarding insertion of sex discrimination by Representative Howard
Smith).
39. This traditional argument has been described as the "equality principle":
In the struggle to gain access to broader job opportunities, the primary litiga-
tion tool was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the primary analytic as-
sumption was the "equality principle." .. . [Flor purposes of securing employ-
ment, women were "similarly situated" to men. As a group, women possessed
the varied physical and intellectual qualities necessary to litigate cases, draw up
budgets, and dig ditches.
Abrams, supra note 31, at 1186. Bona fide occupational qualifications were an exception
to this general argument.
40. "However, some scholars might argue that the statute is a poor choice to enforce
a theory that differs so much from the equality principle that was central at its incep-
tion." Id. at 1196.
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treme ones.41 Labelling unsolicited comments and requests for
dates as examples of sexual harassment is the subject of much
more controversy than, for instance, a supervisor requiring his
female employee to perform certain sexual favors if she intends to
keep her job.42 Sexually harassing behavior by a supervisor is typ-
ically viewed as more problematic than similar behavior by co-
workers. Compliments, sexual innuendoes, sexual jokes, sexual ref-
erences scattered throughout conversations, and subtle pressure to
comply with implied sexual demands are all in the "gray" area for
many people.43 In contrast, pornography, extremely vulgar lan-
guage, sexual touching and battery, including rape, and other
forms of sexual violence seem to be more universally agreed-upon
forms of harassment.'
If a male tells a female co-worker that she always looks very
nice when she comes into the office in the mornings, and that he
would love to take her out to dinner sometime, is this harassment?
A man might respond, "Unequivocally, no. This is just a compli-
ment." A woman might respond, "How can I be taken seriously as
a colleague and professional equal when one of my co-workers lets
41. The greater acceptance of the extreme examples of harassment undoubtedly con-
tributes to the earlier acceptance, by courts, of quid pro quo claims, in contrast to the
more complicated hostile environment claims.
42. Eliza G.C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment... Some See
It... Some Won't, 59 HARV. BUS. REV. 76, 84-85 (1981).
The HBR [Harvard Business Review] survey data provides a powerful illustra-
tion of how gender affects perception of the problem .... The results show a
wide disparity between men's and women's views regarding norms for appro-
priate social behavior in the workplace .... In short, this survey makes it clear
that whether you see sexual harassment, what you see, and how you interpret
that view is a function of who you are and where you are in the organization.
Eleanor K. Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Law
and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M. L. REV. 91, 98-99 (1987).
43. Some scholars do not find these areas gray at all, and are quite adamant that
women simply do not have a legal remedy for such trivial and inconsequential behaviors.
"Title VII was not meant or designed to change certain work environments wherein
vulgar language, sexual jokes and offensive conversations may abound. In these circum-
stances one who enters such a work force has consented to the existing environment."
P.J. Murray, Comment, Employer: Beware of "Hostile Environment" Sexual Harassment,
26 DUQ. L. REv. 461, 479 (1987) (footnote omitted). Murray, like the Rabidue court
from which he adopted this theory, has overlooked the obvious consequence that if this
interpretation of Title VII were accurate, it would support no hostile environment claim
whatsoever. Furthermore, under this theory, discrimination against women in the
workplace is condoned--clearly not the intent of Congress or the implication of most
judicial precedent.
44. A district court first acknowledged pornography as a form of harassment in Rob-
inson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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me know at work that he is interested in me sexually?" Both of
these statements are valid when perceived within their different
conceptual frameworks. 45 As to the first statement, work may be
seen as a logical place for single adults to meet other single adults.
It follows then that workers who are attracted to each other desire
to socialize outside the workplace. Many people are concerned
that sexual harassment codes and regulations may chill potential
personal relationships between men and women who work togeth-
er.
As to the second statement, women are in a very different
position as a group than are men in the working world. There are
fewer women in professional positions, and they are typically paid
less than their male counterparts.' Also, there are still a greater
number of women than men in traditionally female-dominated
occupations such as secretary, nurse, and primary school teach-
er.4' Institutionally then, women are in a position of relative
45. A newspaper article written during the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill controversy
highlights this perception gap:
Women and men also hold vastly different views of what constitutes a
sexual advance. In one sexual-harassment case decided earlier this year, a fe-
male welder in Jacksonville, Fla., alleged that a boys' club atmosphere, complete
with pornographic pinups, created an offensive environment for women.
The federal judge allowed certain sociological testimony to be introduced.
Experts testified that about 75% of men polled said they would be flattered by
sexual advances in the workplace, while 15% said they would be offended. But
75% of the women polled said they would be offended.
Lublin, supra note 35, at B1, BS.
46. In professional specialties, the median weekly earnings of men are greater than
those of women. According to statistics provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, men earn
$748 per week while women earn $559. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 412 (112th ed. 1992) [hereinafter STAT/TICAL AB-
STRACT].
47. Of 3,791,000 secretaries, 99% are women. Of 591,000 typists, 95.1% are women.
Of 875,000 receptionists, 97.1% are women.
Although only 20.1% of 575,000 doctors are women, women still comprise 94.8% of
1,712,000 nurses, and 77.9% of 340,000 therapists; 98.2% of 177,000 dental assistants are
women.
In 1991, of 773,000 teachers in colleges and universities, only 40.8% were women.
Compare this figure to the following of women in primary and secondary education: Of
all other teachers, women comprise 74.3%. Among pre-kindergarten and kindergarten
instructors, women make up 98.7%; elementary, 85.9%; special education, 83.7%; second-
ary schools, 54.7%; educational and vocational counselors, 64.4%; and, finally, of librari-
ans, 83%.
Women also dominate the service occupations dealing with child care and cleaning
in a private household-96% of 787,000. Outside the home, 81.6% of 1,355,000 wait-
ers/waitresses are women and 70.6% of 131,000 kitchen workers/food preparers.
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powerlessness in the business world. Decisions about their profes-
sional futures are often in the hands of male supervisors. When
one of these men says, "Gee, you always look so nice when you
come into the office in the mornings. I sure would like, to take
you out to dinner sometime," it is understandable that a female
employee may feel somewhat uncomfortable saying "no." When
and if she does say "no," and the supervisor persists, the situation
becomes strained. Pressure to socialize, and comments indicating
romantic or sexual interest in an employee can make the working
environment uncomfortable or even hostile, depending on the
supervisor's degree of interest. In this type of situation a female
employee must not only continue to perform her job, but must
also avoid the perpetrator and potentially compromising or sexual-
ly stressful situations.
It is vital to consider sexually harassing behavior from the
perspective, not of the court in judging the alleged perpetrator and
victim, but of the woman in assessing the conduct she labels sexual
harassment. A woman has a "greater physical and social vulnera-
bility to sexual coercion," and a greater exposure to both the
threat of sexual violence and the vast pornography industry which
creates "continuous images of sexual coercion, objectification, and
violence."' Because of the very different implications an uninvit-
ed sexual encounter might have for a woman than for a man in
this larger societal context, it is understandable that a woman and
a man would perceive such incidents differently. A woman who is
trying to establish herself in a male-dominated or nontraditional
career may not regard a seemingly innocuous comment as a joke,
because the content of the comment undermines the professional
image she is trying to project and maintain, i.e., as an equal and a
colleague in the working environment.
Historically, the public/private dichotomization of labor and of
gender roles has had the effect of commodifying, within the public
sphere, men's minds and women's bodies. Both have been avail-
able at a price. Women, as relative newcomers to professional
Compare these traditionally female-dominated professions with the traditionally
male-dominated professions as of 1991. Of 744,000 lawyers, only 19% were women; of
438,000 natural scientists, 26.1% were women; and of 1,846,000 engineers, 8.2% were
women. In the higher-paid service occupations, women comprise only 23% of 220,000
firefighters and 14% of 870,000 police officers and detectives. Id. at 392-94.
48. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1204.
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environments must overcome the societal tendency to perceive
women in the public sphere as bodies first and people second. The
practical consequences of this social dichotomization face every
woman on the job, whether or not she is conscious of the theoreti-
cal nature of the problem. Her position of relative powerlessness-
historically, socially, and economically-structures the way she
views incidents of sexual behavior from supervisors and co-work-
ers. It is in this context that judges need to consider what types of
behavior women might find threatening, intimidating, offensive, or
hostile.
B. The Power Dimension for Female Victims
Sexual harassment is less an issue about sex than it is an issue
of power. It is an injury to an individual in a specific context, but
it is also an injury to a woman because she is a member of the
larger group "women."49 Although there is no doubt that men
are sexually harassed, it is difficult to compare the sexual harass-
ment of men with that of women in a parallel fashion precisely
because of the power issue.50 Though a male employee may be
harassed by a female supervisor, the man retains a degree of pow-
er in relation to the woman on the gender axis of the analysis.
The inappropriateness of comparing what might seem to be analo-
gous instances of sexual harassment is due also to the perception
49. There is distinct disagreement among scholars about whether Title VII is the-
oretically suitable to the practical resolution of sexual harassment cases. Many scholars
believe that Title VII was designed to address group injury and that sexual harassment is
an injury to an individual that disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis cannot
adequately address. See Paul, supra note 2, at 364 (arguing that the courts, by accepting
sexual harassment suits under Title VII, have "unwittingly imported philosophical assump-
tions from a radical agenda that characterizes all women as victims and all men as op-
pressors"; and offering the new tort of sexual harassment as an alternative). Eleanor
Bratton also acknowledges the inadequacies of Title VII, but with a more constructive
and theoretically sound approach: "Women are individually victimized on the basis of
their sexuality within a social/institutional context which denigrates them on the basis of
their membership in a group. Although they are necessarily injured one at a time, sexual
harassment victims are not discriminated against as individuals." Bratton, supra note 42,
at 105.
50. Men can bring sexual harassment suits under Title VII, and would consequently
benefit from the application of the reasonable victim as opposed to the reasonable wom-
an/man standard. Considering the larger societal and economic context, sexual harassment
against a man seems more easily characterized as a violation against an individual than a
violation against a member of a group. The reasonable victim standard also could be




problem. Whereas women claim to be harassed by sexual "compli-
ments" or requests for dates, men may not be similarly offended
by such behavior coming from female co-workers. Some men have
the tendency to assume that certain types of conduct are not ha-
rassment if they themselves would not mind being subjected to
such behavior."'
Because of the power differential between men and women,
women face sexual harassment from supervisors, co-workers, and,
occasionally, subordinates. The effects of the power structure are
more apparent when the man is acting in a supervisory capacity
over the woman than when the parties are co-workers. Men often
find it more difficult to see harassment when it is perpetrated by
male co-workers.5 2 This inability stems from a failure or refusal
to acknowledge the power differential that exists between men and
women in our society, both within and without the working envi-
ronment5 3 The hostile environment cases all contain this basic
issue: Is power, by men over women, being used in a sexually
exploitative or discriminatory way in the workplace? Following the
EEOC guidelines, 4 the courts stress the need to look at the to-
tality of the circumstances, but often seem to disregard the power
dimension in the hierarchically structured employment context that
is bolstered by a traditionally hierarchically structured society.55
51. Researchers indicate that men are not necessarily offended by sexual behavior in
the workplace that women may interpret as harassing.
Barbara Gutek's empirical investigation of sex in the workplace reveals
that women are more likely to regard a sexual encounter, verbal or physical, as
coercive.. . .In contrast, men are less likely to regard such conduct as harass-
ing, and more likely to view it as a flattering reflection on their physical .or
personal attributes. Men are also more likely to perceive such encounters as
mutually desired, whereas vomen are more likely to feel that encounters were
desired only by the more powerful, initiating party.
Abrams, supra note 31, at 1204-05 (footnotes omitted).
52. Collins & Blodgett, supra note 42, at 79-80.
53. Because co-workers are individuals similarly situated within the hierarchy of the
workplace, some men fail to recognize the power differential between men and women
that takes so many forms in society: legal, economic, and professional, among others.
Hostile work environment is the "harder issue" in sexual harassment
cases, for several reasons. First, hostile work environment claims are problematic
in that offenders are often co-workers or others who have no formal, recog-
nized authority over the victim, often triggering an assumption that the offender
is not in a position to harm the victim. Consequently, some courts may assume
that no harm has occurred, failing to recognize the non-neutrality of the exist-
ing gender-hierarchy.
Pollack, supra note 4, at 50-51 (footnote omitted).
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1991); see supra note 3.
55. Although it cannot hold an employer liable for the evils of society, so to speak,
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When sexual harassment occurs in the workplace there are two
axes of power to consider: that inherent in the employer/employee
relationship and the societal imbalance of power that currently
exists between men and women.
C. The Effect of Gender Stereotypes on Popular Perception
Gender stereotypes affect the way we view sexual conduct by
men and the sexual receptivity of women. As in the context of
rape, female victims of sexual harassment are often perceived as
"asking for it" or inviting the alleged harassment by the way they
dress, speak, or act. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,56 the Su-
preme Court defined one prong of its standard as an evaluation of
whether or not the female plaintiff initially welcomed the atten-
tions she later labelled harassment. In its discussion of the
"voluntariness" issue, the Court clarified that a woman who vol-
untarily sleeps with her supervisor in order to keep her job does
not necessarily "welcome" the conduct-and does not forfeit her
claim of harassment. But the Court did allow evidence regarding
the victim's manner of dress, speech, and conduct to determine
whether she did in fact "welcome" the advances. Depending on
the trier of fact, the elicitation and use of this type of evidence
may re-victimize the victim, making it effectively impossible for a
woman to succeed on a claim:57
a court does have the power to consider how the cultural norms of our society impact
the dynamics of the working environment and the harm resulting from sexually harassing
incidents that take place within that cultural context.
56. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
57. In the context of rape, evidence of this nature is often prohibited by rape shield
laws. The victim's prior sexual relationship with the alleged perpetrator would always be
relevant, but her past sexual life is generally protected. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8C-1, Rule 412 (1988). By making the manner in which a victim of sexual harassment
dresses and speaks relevant, the Meritor Court places the evidence in the first category,
assuming a relevant relationship with the defendant and implicitly suggesting that the
woman dressed or spoke in a certain way for that person. This interpretation is the only
one that can validate the Court's ruling. It would be unreasonable to say that a woman
who dresses in an "objectively" provocative manner-if such a thing could ever be de-
fined-welcomes conduct of a sexual nature from all men in her immediate working
environment. The difficulty of assessing what kind of dress qualifies as "provocative,"
combined with the unfairness of the presumption that if a woman dresses provocatively
she is doing it for the benefit of a particular man (i.e., to invite his sexual advances),
renders the Court's holding on the issue both unwise and skewed in the favor of the
defendant. For further discussion of the "unwelcomeness" standard, see supra note 29.
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While "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to
such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually
provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in
determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances
unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously rele-
vant.
The definition of "provocative" varies with the diversity of the
defining audience. Gender stereotypes shape these definitions for
many people. The way a "lady" should look, act, dress, and speak
often works against sexual harassment victims who do not coiform
to the norms offered by traditional and contemporary stereo-
types5 9 By leaving the word "unwelcome" open to such broad
interpretations by lower courts, the Supreme Court in Meritor
establishes a standard that is potentially debilitating to plaintiffs.
Our societal expectations about gender role conformity extend
to men as well as to women. "Boys will be boys" and "Men will
be men" are possibly two of the most popular quips used to justify
and rationalize male sexual -behavior. Traditional sexual lore per-
petuates the idea that men are supposedly more sexual animals
than women: There is a popular notion that men just can't help
themselves when it comes to sex, and that women are responsible
for controlling men's behavior.6 "Scholarly" articles have offered
this biologically based myth as a fact that ought to govern the
remedies and legal responses to sexual harassment: "[W]omen
have a responsibility not to encourage males to make sexual ad-
vances. This can be done by refraining from acting in a flirtatious
or sexually inviting manner, dressing in a sexually provocative
manner or talking in a manner that would welcome sexual advanc-
es."' 
6
This statement relies on the Supreme Court's language in
Meritor to bolster the purportedly rational solution to the problem
of sexual harassment: "It would not be unreasonable to conclude
58. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
59. For an example of the way in which gender stereotypes about the way a "lady"
should look, act, walk, and talk, become relevant in sexual discimination cases, see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
60. TIMOTHY BENEiKE, MEN ON RAPE 125 (1982) (A psychoanalyst and family thera-
pist in Atlanta discusses women who "invite rape": "Women have the capacity to arouse
a man-there's no question about that. And once the man gets involved, once the sexual
motor gets going, the sexual drive may take over.").
61. Murray, supra note 43, at 483.
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that where a woman clad herself in sexually provocative clothing,
acted and spoke in a provocative manner, or otherwise indicated
she may have been interested in a sexual relationship, sexual ad-
vances were not unwelcome." 62 Neatly undermining a plaintiff's
claim of sexual harassment with undue and entirely subjective
emphasis on unwelcomeness, the statement offers "provocative,"
"flirtatious," and "sexually inviting" as if these were objective
realities susceptible to scientific determination. There is no objec-
tive understanding of the word "provocative." The judge, the vic-
tim, the perpetrator, and commentators will all have different
understandings based on their different experiences and perspec-
tives. This common idea that women are somehow responsible for
controlling men's sexual behavior deflects the responsibility from
the male perpetrator onto the female victim. Such recommenda-
tions to women specifically support the notion that if women dress
in a certain way, men will not be able to control themselves-i.e.,
that women just have to expect what they inevitably get. 3
The perception gaps between men and women, the power
dynamics inherent in a sexual harassment situation in which a
woman is the victim, and popular gender stereotypes are all fac-
tors that must be considered in a coherent analysis of a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim. Indeed, proponents of the
reasonable woman standard argue that the Supreme Court's stan-
dard delineated in Meritor has not proven effective in dealing with
sexual harassment claims precisely because the reasonable person
standard most frequently applied by the lower courts to give
meaning to terms such as "severe," "pervasive," "hostile," and
62. Id.
63. Murray reveals the biases that enable the conclusions in other statements
throughout the article: "Flirtatious behavior and romantic attraction surely cannot be
classified as 'sexual advances' in the sense of harassment." Id. at 473-74. Murray com-
pletely misses the overwhelming problem that plagues sexual harassment victims. Behavior
that men would classify as romantic or harmless flirtation is often characterized by wom-
en as harassing. Murray takes a behavior and characterizes it "objectively" as a flirtation
while failing to acknowledge that the perspective used in this process is highly subjective.
Murray continues, "In most instances where insults and sexist comments are the only
behavior claimed to be harassing, the victim is overly sensitive to the subject matter of
the insult." Id. at 475. This statement is an even more blatant revelation of a complete
lack of understanding about the issue of perspective. The explicit message is that women
should not be permitted to recover legally merely because they feel harassed by sexist
comments. The fact that Murray believes the article offers an "objective" victim standard




"abusive" masks these highly relevant factors. The recent cases of
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. and Ellison v. Brady illustrate the
consequences both of failure to consider the factors of perception
and power and, alternatively, of attempts to consider these factors
explicitly.
FII. RABIDUE AND ELLISON: THE REASONABLE PERSON
AND THE REASONABLE WOMAN
A. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.: The Reasonable Person
Standard and the Apparent Need for a Reasonable Woman's
Perspective in the Law
The traditional reasonable person standard, applied using the
vague language of the Meritor standard, does not mandate a rigor-
ous or insightful analysis of the plaintiff's perspective in sexual
harassment cases. The Sixth Circuit's manipulation of the Meritor
standard in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.' illustrates the
standard's susceptibility to debilitating interpretation. Douglas Hen-
ry, an employee of Osceola, persistently called his co-worker,
Vivienne Rabidue, and other female employees, "whores," "cunt,"
"pussy," "tits," and "fat ass." He said of Rabidue, "All that bitch
needs is a good lay."'65 He and other male employees insisted on
displaying pornographic pictures of women in common work ar-
eas.' In particular, one picture, displayed for eight years, showed
a naked, prone woman with a golf ball on her chest and a man
standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling "Fore."67 Rather
than dealing with these facts explicitly,6 the majority chose to fo-
cus instead on Rabidue's "irascible and opinionated personality
and her inability to work harmoniously with co-workers, 69 not
64. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
65. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting). This language was analyzed by the district court
as follows: "[Pilaintiff's overall work experience was not substantially affected by Mr.
Henry's vulgarity. Instead the vulgarity merely constituted an annoying-but fairly insig-
nificant-part of the total job environment." 584 F. Supp. 419, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1984),
affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
66. 805 F.2d at 623-24.
67. Id. at 624.
68. It is interesting to note that neither the district court nor the Sixth Circuit explic-
itly and accurately state the facts of the case. They do not even attempt to describe the
aspects of the working environment that Vivienne Rabidue found offensive. The facts of
the record are only fully revealed in Judge Keith's dissdnt to the Sixth Circuit opinion.
69. 805 F.2d at 615.
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analyzing in the least how these personality traits may very well
have been exacerbated, if not caused, by the hostile working envi-
ronment she was subjected to on a daily basis."0
The Sixth Circuit majority, using the reasonable person stan-
dard, concluded that Henry's obscenities, "although annoying, were
not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the
plaintiff or other female employees."'" The majority relied on the
analysis of the district court: "As Judge Newblatt aptly stat-
ed ... : 'Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some
work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and
vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can [sic]-change
this.' "
The court applied a two-part test: 1) a reasonable person must
be adversely affected by the alleged sexual harassment; and 2) the
plaintiff must show that she was actually offended. The first prong
of the test establishes the unreasonableness of the conduct. The
second prong is suspect in that it does not add anything to the
investigation of the conduct at issue and merely gives the court an
opportunity to put the plaintiff on trial by examining her personal
background, sexual history, and manner of dress and speech.7
Effectively, the second prong of the test asks the victim whether
she is, in fact, a reasonable person. Interestingly, conduct deter-
70. Commenting on Rabidue, Lucinda Finley writes:
This description of the facts trivialized the conduct and placed a subtle sugges-
tion of blame on the victim: knowing poor Henry was vulgar, Rabidue should
have done something to reduce the acrimony, she should have known that men
used bad language and had the posters displayed, and thus she voluntarily en-
countered her problems and assumed the risk of working in the environment.
Clearly, the manner in which a court characterizes the facts, what it
chooses to focus on, and what it leaves unmentioned, can be part of gender bi-
as.
Finley, supra note 8, at 61 n.65 (citations omitted).
71. 805 F.2d at 622. This statement offers one of the most valuable insights into the
importance of perspective. See supra Section 11(A).
72. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620-21 (quoting 584 F. Supp. at 430); see also Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Title VII is not a clean language act, and it
does not require employers to extirpate all signs of centuries-old prejudices."). The
Rabidue opinions are "noteworthy for their suggestion that sexual innuendo or pornogra-
phy is simply a stronger form of 'rough manners' . . . . [Tihe gently dismissive term
'girlie magazines' suggest[s] an almost amused tolerance that reflects no awareness of how
female plaintiffs might perceive these affronts." Abrams, supra note 31, at 1201.
73. Justice Rehnquist would argue that this type of investigation enables the court to
discern whether the conduct was unwelcome. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 69 (1986); supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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mined to be racially offensive to a reasonable person in the con-
text of racial discrimination is presumed to offend the victim:
Victims of racial discrimination are not subjected to the second
prong of the Rabidue test in the Sixth Circuit.74
Writing for the Rabidue majority, Judge Krupansky stated that
it is appropriate to assess whether the plaintiff voluntarily entered
a working environment where she could reasonably expect to find
lewd or off-color humor and behavior.' Judge Krupansky's read-
ing of voluntariness strips Title VII of any effectiveness whatsoev-
er.76 Title VII is specifically intended to protect people from be-
ing forced to work in degrading, offensive, and debilitating envi-
ronments. "Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetua-
tion of stereotypes and a sense of degradation which serve to close
or discourage employment opportunities for women."'  Rabidue's
standard merely serves to entrench further the existing sexist status
quo by severely limiting women's opportunities to enter and work
successfully within traditionally male-dominated workplaces and
professions.
The reasonable person standard, when based on a male per-
spective, effectively reinforces the status quo or the societal norm.
Often, these norms will not be hospitable to women. The Rabidue
court illustrated this point vividly in its discussion of pornography.
The majority attempted to justify allowing pornographic displays in
74. In racially hostile environment claims brought in the Sixth Circuit, only the first
part of the test is required. The conduct must merely be unreasonable or affect a rea-
sonable person's ability to perform her job. It is assumed that plaintiff would be offend-
ed by that conduct. See generally Lisa Rhode, Note, The Sixth Circuit's Double Standard
in Hostile Work Environment Claims: Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th
Cir. 1988), 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 799-801 (1989).
75. 805 F.2d at 620. As the dissent noted, "The majority suggests through these
factors that a woman assumes the risk of working in an abusive, anti-female environ-
ment." 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
76. As the Mentor Court recognized, voluntariness is not the appropriate focus of
the inquiry in sexual harassment claims. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. A woman may volun-
tarily participate in sexual conduct if she feels it is necessary to keep her job. The
Meritor Court stated that the proper inquiry is whether the complainant welcomed the
allegedly offensive sexual conduct. Id. In Rabidue, Judge Krupansky's use of the
"voluntariness" concept is extremely debilitating to plaintiffs and is not in accord with the
purpose of Title VII. Women voluntarily enter many working environments because they
have to-to earn money and to support families. According to Meritor, the appropriate
inquiry is whether, once a woman is within a particular working environment, she indi-
cates, by her conduct, that sexual advances are unwelcome. Id.
77. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
1993]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:854
the workplace by noting that they are, after all, an integral part of
American society:
The sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on
the plaintiffs work environment when considered in the context
of a society that condones and publicly features and commercially
exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the
newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other
public places.7"
The poster featuring a man teeing off on a woman's bare
chest is not, under any "reasonable" definition of the word,
"erotic." This is not a mere picture of a naked body or an erotic
sex act.79 It is an example of violent pornography. The district
court argued, in effect, that the pornography and vulgar language
had a "de minimis effect" because Vivienne Rabidue should not
78. Rabidue, 805 F.2d. at 622 (emphasis added). This illogical analysis is based on
the fallacious assumption that women are not offended or intimidated by the pornography
inundating American society. Women are not the primary consumers of pornography, but
activists' intensive efforts to restrict and ban pornography have not been successful to
date. Judge Krupansky's analysis essentially used a pornographic society, in which women
do not have power to eliminate the offensive material, to justify a workplace in which
women are equally powerless. But see Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485-86 ("Obscene language
and pornography quite possibly could be regarded as 'highly offensive to a woman who
seeks to deal with her fellow employees and clients with professional dignity and without
the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse.' . . . Although men may find these ac-
tions harmless and innocent, it is highly possible that women may feel otherwise.") (cita-
tions omitted); Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting) ("The presence of pin-ups
and misogynous language in the workplace can only evoke and confirm the debilitating
norms by which women are primarily and contemptuously valued as objects of male
sexual fantasy.").
79. Gloria Steinem's essay Erotica v. Pornography provides a thoughtful commentary
on the differences between these two types of sexual imagery. Steinem describes erotica
as images of people making love. Nudity is clearly a factor, but she stresses that the
people are there because they want to be-mutually sharing a sexual experience. On the
other hand, there are images of sex
in which there is force, violence, or symbols of unequal power .... They may
be ...subtle: the use of class, race, authority, or just body poses to convey
conqueror and victim; unequal nudity, with one person's body exposed and vul-
nerable while the other is armored with clothes ....
These two sorts of images are as different as love is from rape, as dignity
is from humiliation . . . .Yet they are confused and lumped together as ...
"erotica" or "explicit sex," because sex and violence are so dangerously inter-
twined and confused.
GLORIA STEINEM, Erotica v. Pornography, in OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY RE-
BELLIONS 219, 219-20 (1983). In view of this definition, suffice it to say that the Rabidue
court's characterization of the violent pornography as erotica may be slightly, if not radi-
cally, misleading, particularly to those individuals trying to assess the effects the pornog-
raphy was likely to have on Vivienne Rabidue.
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have been legally offended by the pornography, and because the
language, although annoying, was insignificant. Thus, the district
court distinctly used the fact that we have a sexist society to justi-
fy the acceptability of a sexist workplace.' Following the district
court's example, the Sixth Circuit demonstrated that Title VII is
clearly not legislation "designed to bring about a magical transfor-
mation in the social mores of American workers.",81
The Rabidue court assumed that because pornography is
readily available on the newsstands, women could not possibly be
highly offended by it in the working environment. This is not an
example of logical reasoning. The better-reasoned argument would
acknowledge that pornography is so widely available precisely
because men provide a market for it,' regardless of women's
perceptions or opinions about the material. Using the "average" or
"reasonable" male's perspective on pornography, then, denies the
typical female perspective. By labelling the applied standard that
of the reasonable person, the male perspective is presented as
representative of women as well. The use of this "gender-neutral"
legal standard thus has the effect of denying the female perspec-
tive and reinforcing the male-oriented status quo.
Meritor held that hostile environment sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII if the alleged conduct is sufficiently
severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment.83 But
Meritor provided the individual judges with an immense amount of
interpretive freedom. Thus, as Rabidue illustrates, lower courts
80. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Rea-
sonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1205 (1990).
In equating "reasonableness" with societal consensus (that is, in defining dis-
crimination as deviation from the status quo), the Rabidue [appellate] court
(like all courts using this definition of reasonableness) necessarily assumes that
the status quo itself is egalitarian, pluralistic, and nondiscriminatory. . . [T]he
Rabidue majority implicitly assumed that sexual discrimination is merely deviant
behavior by individuals, rather than a structural problem inherent in American
ideology and institutions.
Id.
81. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 805
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
82. Most of the pornography on the market is directed at a male audience-both
heterosexual and homosexual. Even magazines like Playgirl, which are ostensibly for
women, have a significant male audience.
83. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
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have illiberally construed the Meritor decision.' Fortunately, how-
ever, not all courts have used this power so irresponsibly.
B. Ellison v. Brady: The Argument for Adopting a Reasonable
Woman Standard
Some courts have tried to fashion a test that allows for the
equal consideration of the perspectives of both the perpetrator and
the victim.8' Other courts, like the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v.
Brady, 6 have adopted a reasonable woman standard.' The ju-
risdictions that have followed Ellison's reasoning believe that the
"reasonableness" aspect of the reasonable woman standard will
shield employers from having to accommodate the idiosyncratic
concerns of the hypersensitive employee.' Proponents of the rea-
sonable woman standard argue that its "woman" aspect provides a
more accurate assessment of what conduct and language is sexually
offensive to women, thereby preventing the enforcement of the
often sexist status quo-which is exactly what women are trying to
84. As Abrams notes:
In evaluating these claims, courts often must choose between the conflicting
views of the alleged harassment. Because most judges are men, who have expe-
rienced the traditional forms of male socialization, their instinctive reaction is to
accept the perspective of the employer ..... [A] characteristically "male" view,
which depicts sexual taunts, inquiries or magazines as a comparatively harmless
amusement, or as the treatment women should expect when they push their
way into the workplace, pervades many recent opinions.
Abrams, supra note 31, at 1203 (footnote omitted).
85. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988)
("Unless the fact finder keeps both the man's and the woman's perspective in mind,
'defendants as well as the courts [will be] permitted to sustain ingrained notions of rea-
sonable behavior fashioned by the offenders.' ") (alteration in original) (quoting Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, . dissenting), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
86. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 878. The Sixth Circuit rejected its Rabidue rationale in favor of the rea-
sonable woman standard in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987):
[I]t seems only reasonable that the person standing in the shoes of the employ-
ee should be "the reasonable woman" since the plaintiff in this type of case is
required to be a member of a protected class and is by definition female ....
Were this a sexual harassment case involving a male subordinate, the "reason-
able man" standard should be applied. We acknowledge that men and women
are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior.
Id. at 637 & n.2.
88. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879; see also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,
626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting) ("I would have courts adopt the perspective of
the reasonable victim which simultaneously allows courts to consider salient sociological
differences as well as shield employers from the neurotic complainant."), cer. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987).'
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escape, at least while they are within the confines of the
workplace. 9
1. Ellison v. Brady. In Ellison v. Brady,' Kerry Ellison,
an agent for the Internal Revenue Service, found herself in an un-
comfortable, frightening situation with a co-worker, Sterling Gray.
At her San Mateo, California office, it was customary for co-work-
ers to go to lunch together, often in groups. One day, when no
one else was in the office, Ellison accepted Gray's invitation to
lunch. Following this occasion, Gray began to "hang around"
Ellison, "pester[ing] her with unnecessary questions."' He asked
her out on dates which she declined. He finally wrote Ellison a
note: "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. I
have never been in such constant term oil [sic]. Thank you for
talking with me. I could not stand to feel your hatred for another
day.'')9 Extremely disturbed, Ellison spoke with her supervisor,
who labelled Gray's conduct sexual harassment. Ellison said she
would like to try to handle the situation herself, and she had a
male co-worker ask Gray to leave her alone. Gray was not daunt-
ed. Even after Ellison transferred to Missouri for a four-week
training period, he sent her a typed, single-spaced, three-page let-
ter.
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex..... I
have enjoyed you so much over these past few months. Watching
you. Experiencing you from 0 so far away. Admiring your style
and elan .... Don't you think it odd that two people who have
never even talked together, alone, are striking off such intense
sparks .... I will [write] another letter in the near future.93
89. In Rabidue, Judge Krupansky took the position that the reasonable person stan-
dard could accomplish both of these goals. It is theoretically possible that a "truly" rea-
sonable judge may be able to provide protection for victims using the reasonable person
standard. The majority's skewed reasoning, however, afforded Vivienne Rabidue abso-
lutely no protection. Also, practically discerning the "objectively" reasonable decision begs
the question in this context. See Abrams, supra note 31, at 1203 ("Hostile environment
doctrine must begin from an understanding of the way in which those practices chal-
lenged as sexual harassment are likely to be experienced differently by women than by
men.").
90. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 873.
92. Id. at 874.
93. Id. (alteration in original).
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Alarmed by Gray's persistence and obstinance, Ellison was
afraid of what he might do to her. She filed a formal complaint
with the IRS and asked her supervisor to take remedial action. As
a result, Gray was assigned to another California location. Six
months later, when she was notified that he was to return to the
San Mateo office, Ellison once again became worried. The Trea-
sury Department did not believe that Ellison's complaint alleged
conduct covered by the EEOC guidelines, and the EEOC felt that
a six-month transfer was an adequate remedy. Having exhausted
her nonlegal resources, Ellison filed a formal sexual harassment
complaint. The district court held that Ellison did not establish a
prima facie case: Ellison's allegations did not indicate an environ-
ment sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of
the workplace or to create an abusive atmosphere. The court be-
lieved, rather, that Gray's conduct was "isolated and genuinely
trivial,"'94 and thereby granted the government's motion for sum-
mary judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reason-
able woman standard, reversing and remanding the trial court's
decision.
The Ninth Circuit applied Meritor's standard regarding the
pervasiveness and severity of abusive behavior, but added a pro-
tective measure for the female plaintiff by substituting the percep-
tion of a reasonable woman for that of a reasonable person. The
court held that a "female plaintiff states a prima facie case of
hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct
which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment."' Ellison met this standard be-
cause the court found that "[a] reasonable woman could consider
Gray's conduct, as alleged by Ellison, sufficiently severe and per-
vasive . . . ."' Judge Beezer explained the court's rationale:
If we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage
in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforc-
ing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could contin-
ue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice
was common, and victims of harassment would have no remedy.
94. ld. at 876.
95. Ld. at 879 (footnote omitted).
96. Id. at 880.
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We therefore prefer to analyze harassment from the victim's
perspective. A complete understanding of the victim's view re-
quires, among other things, an analysis of the different perspec-
tives of men and women. Conduct that many men [would] con-
sider unobjectionable may offend many women.97
2. Arguments Offered by Proponents of the Reasonable Wom-
an Standard. Proponents of the reasonable woman standard argue
that "[h]ostile environment doctrine must begin from an under-
standing of the way in which those practices challenged as sexual
harassment are likely to be experienced differently by women than
by men."98 Even though there may be substantial differences
among women, there are yet greater differences between women
and men due to social factors.
While many women hold positive attitudes about uncoerced sex,
their greater physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion
can make women wary of sexual encounters. Moreover, Ameri-
can women have been raised in a society where rape and sex-
related violence have reached unprecedented levels, and a vast
pornography industry creates continuous images of sexual coer-
cion, objectification and violence. Finally, women as a group tend
to hold more restrictive views of both the situation and the type
of relationship in which sexual conduct is appropriate. Because of
the inequality and coercion with which it is so frequently associ-
ated in the minds of women, the appearance of sexuality in an
unexpected context or setting of ostensible equality can be an
anguishing experience. 9
Additionally, proponents of the reasonable woman standard
illustrate the political nature of the judgments courts make in
sexual harassment cases by emphasizing these societally construct-
ed differences between men and women." They reject the tradi-
97. Id. at 878.
98. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1203.
99. Id. at 1205 (footnotes omitted).
100. I use the word "political" in this context to mean that women's rights and auton-
omy as citizens within the state can be severely compromised when women are subjected
to an ostensibly gender-neutral standard in a society hierarchically structured along gen-
der lines. The neutrality and objectivity that are the goals of such a standard are neces-
sarily illusory in this context. The traditional reasonable person standard has the tendency
to assume the equality of both parties. The reasonable woman standard highlights both
the political situation that creates this illusion as well as the political consequences (for
all women) of the decisions rendered in these cases (brought by individual women). Es-
IM9] 883
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tionalist torts approach that balances the rights of two individu-
als-the man's right to free speech and conduct against the
woman's right to work unmolested and unoffended. 0' This bal-
ancing approach is considered ineffective because it assumes the
equal positioning of the parties-both socially and in the working
environment. Regardless of the theoretical equality of all people,
women, both historically and currently, do not have as much so-
cial, political, or economic power as men do in this country.1" In
effect, women as a group have less decisionmaking power in the
workplace and, therefore, less control.
Civil rights legislation has enabled women to seek decision-
making power and a measure of control within the workplace
where it has been unlawfully denied. Under Title VII, women can-
not be turned away, because of their sex, from jobs for which they
are otherwise qualified. Proponents of the reasonable woman stan-
dard may argue cogently that equal access to the workplace does
not always translate into equal freedom and power within the
workplace, and that nothing precludes Title VII from being uti-
lized to redress oppressive and discriminatory working conditions
where they exist. The argument can be constructed as follows: In a
perfect society, men and women with equal power, control, and
freedom may not view sex and sexual conduct differently. In our
imperfect society, however, men and women are victims of social-
sentially, a sexual harassment case is political in that it does not merely concern the
rights of two parties. It is political in that a complaint brought by one woman, and the
treatment that complaint receives within the judicial system, may reflect on and entail
consequences for the larger group of "women."
101. See generally Paul, supra note 2.
102. The political inequality stems from the fact that representation in both federal
and local government, although it is improving, is still far from representative of the
proportion of women in the country. As of November 1992, there are 48 women of 435
members of the U.S. House and 6 women of 100 U.S. Senators. Phil Duncan, Looking
Beyond Gridlock, in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SPECIAL REPORT:. THE NEW CON-
GRESS, Jan. 16, 1993, at 11, 12. Economically, women are still largely represented in low-
skill, underpaid, undervalued jobs, resulting in further inequities. See supra note 47. Wage
disparity is also a factor. Women continue to be paid significantly less than their male
counterparts. See STATISTICAL AMSTRACT, supra note 46, at 412, 452-53. In this country,
more than three-quarters of the people living under the poverty level-77.9%-are wom-
en and children under the age of eighteen. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Poverty in
the United States: 1991 (Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 181, U.S. Gov't
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1992). The social inequality of women results from a
combination of these economic and political factors and traditional notions, influenced by
gender stereotypes, of acceptable women's roles-in the family, in a marriage, as mothers,
and in the workplace.
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ization, and often perceive sexual conduct differently. The instanc-
es of sexual harassment attributable to these different ways of per-
ceiving sexual conduct cannot be addressed effectively with a pur-
portedly gender-neutral standard based on the perception of the
reasonable person. Such a standard serves only to mask the essen-
tial political nature of the reasonableness question and the societal
inequality of women that underlie the problem of sexual harass-
ment. The Ellison majority's language reflects the reasoning behind
this argument:
Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual
conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social
setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may
perceive.
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily
because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard
tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the
experiences of women.1'3
Although it shares some problems with the reasonable person
standard,1" the reasonable woman standard calls for an explicit
recognition of the fact that the choice between plaintiff and defen-
dant in sexual harassment cases may be a political one involving
group dynamics as well as individual rights.
Furthermore, the reasonable woman standard helps negotiate
the distance between the judge as decisionmaker and the plaintiff
or defendant as the beneficiary of that decision by illuminating
potential biases. In sexual harassment cases, almost all of the de-
fendants are men, and almost all of the plaintiffs are women. A
male judge may identify with the male defendant's perspective
more readily than with the female plaintiff's. The reasonable wom-
an standard may encourage a male judge to realize that his ten-
dency to view the man's account of the facts as credible and the
female complainant's as hypersensitive may result from a social-
ization process that resembles the man's as opposed to the
woman's.
In evaluating these claims, courts often must choose between the
conflicting views of the alleged harassment. Because most judges
103. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
104. See infra text accompanying note 112-24.
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are men, who have experienced the traditional forms of male
socialization, their instinctive reaction is to accept the perspective
of the employer .... [A] characteristically "male" view, which
depicts sexual taunts, inquiries or magazines as a comparatively
harmless amusement, or as the treatment women should expect
when they push their way into the workplace, pervades many
recent opinions. It is present in the indulgent attitudes courts
display toward these forms of conduct, in their confusion of
harassment with profanity or rough manners, and in their reluc-
tance to credit the accounts of female plaintiffs.1"
Judge Beezer illustrated this perception gap problem using the
Ellison facts:
[F]rom the alleged harasser's viewpoint, Gray could be portrayed
as a modem-day Cyrano de Bergerac wishing no more than to
woo Ellison with his words. There is no evidence that Gray har-
bored ill will toward Ellison ....
Ellison, however, did not consider the acts to be trivial.
Gray's first note shocked and frightened her. After receiving the
three-page letter, she became really upset and frightened
again.1°6
Identifying with the "characteristic male view," the district court
was reluctant to credit Ellison's account and found Gray's conduct
genuinely trivial. But the appellate court, cognizant of the percep-
tion gap problem, rejected the district court's finding.
The reasonable woman standard has illuminated the percep-
tion gap among men and women on the sensitive issue of sexual
harassment, the political nature of judgments in sexual harassment
cases, and the susceptibility of the more traditional reasonable
person standard to potential socialized "male" bias. Although
deference to the female victim's perspective has enabled these
realizations, the Ninth Circuit's innovative legal standard has en-
gendered concern on the part of potential defendants regarding
the fairness of a standard that seems to assign fault to an individ-
ual man on the basis of an offense he did not intend to commit.
In many cases, as illustrated in Part II above, a woman may per-
ceive sexual conduct as harassing when the man involved in no
way intended to harass her. But legally, harassment can exist with-
out intent. The standard adopted by the Ellison majority
105. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1203.
106. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880 (citation omitted).
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classifies conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even when ha-
rassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile working
environment. Well-intentioned compliments by co-workers or su-
pervisors can form the basis of a sexual harassment cause of
action .... That is because Title VII is not a fault-based tort
scheme. "Title VII is aimed at the consequences or effects of an
employment practice and not at the.., motivation" of co-work-
ers or employers.'0
Hostile working environments detrimentally affect female
employees' ability to work confidently, comfortably, and unmo-
lested." The reasonable woman standard focuses on women's
perceptions and can be used to remedy forms of harassment that
women feel unreasonably interfere with their work perfor-
mance."° It does not, however, assign fault to individual men for
not intuitively discerning women's different sensibilities. A suc-
cessful harassment claim can be levelled at an employer who has
failed to take action after a woman has complained to the man-
agement. The employer who does not take action is at fault for
passivity in the face of a known problematic situation. In light of
this situation, the use of a reasonable woman's perspective encour-
ages employers to create grievance procedures and'to consider
carefully harassment complaints made by female employees from
their point of view. The Ellison majority believed the reasonable
woman standard would raise the general consciousness about sexu-
al harassment: "We hope that over time both men and women will
learn what conduct offends reasonable members of the other sex.
When employers and employees internalize the standard of
workplace conduct we establish today, the current gap in percep-
tion between the sexes will be bridged." '
The reasonable woman standard offered by the Ninth Circuit
allows courts to factor the woman's perspective into the legal
107. Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972)).
108. See Susan E. Martin, Sexual Harassment.- The Link Joining Gender Stratification,
Sexuality, and Women's Economic Status, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 57, 62
(Jo Freeman ed., 4th ed. 1989). Martin enumerates some of the detrimental effects re-
ported to result from incidents of sexual harassment, including: humiliation, shame, anger,
alienation, aloneness, helplessness, guilt, strained relations with men (including husbands),
and loss of ambition and self-confidence, as well as negative views of work.
109. However, under this standard the harassment still has to be pervasive and severe.
110. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881.
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analysis of sexual harassment claims. Although people acknowl-
edge the proposed differences between men and women either
intuitively or reasonably as a consequence of socialization process-
es, many challenge this proposition on two levels. First, some
people do not accept the idea that men and women can be placed
into the discrete categories suggested by the foregoing analysis.
Second, women are very different from one another; many women
reject being lumped into a group labelled "women" and assigned
the viewpoint of relative powerlessness. This latter challenge ex-
poses a fundamental problem with the reasonable woman standard:
Who is she? Is she somehow the average or median of all wom-
en?"' What do women sacrifice or gain by being represented by
this fictional, contrived entity?
IV. THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD HAS
PROBLEMS OF ITS OWN
The problems inherent in the reasonable woman standard
proposed by the Ellison court are certainly not as extreme as
those illustrated by the Rabidue court's effective annihilation of
the sexual harassment claim as a viable option for women. Howev-
er, definitional, theoretical, and practical aspects of the reasonable
woman standard render it an ineffective and potentially harmful
reform. This Part outlines the reasonable woman standard's prob-
lem areas: the difficulty in defining a reasonable woman; the
marginalization that inevitably results from the development of a
separate legal standard of "reasonableness" peculiar to women; the
reification of difference through the implementation of a standard
based on that difference; and, on a practical level, the suscepti-
bility of this new standard to the old problems of perception and
bias. Although some of these problems inhere in one or more of
the alternative standards, this particular combination of problems
posed by the reasonable woman standard causes the known costs
of the suggested reform to outweigh its potential benefits.
111. These definitional problems do not seem insurmountable, however, and women
may be better served by the .perspective of the average woman than of the average man.
"We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we
believe that many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share."
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. Pollack points out that it is necessary to focus, not only on the
woman's perspective, but also on the woman's experience within a gendered hierarchy.
Pollack, supra note 4, at 70 n.134; see infra Section IV(A).
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A. The Definitional Quandary
The reasonable woman standard replicates some of the faults
of the reasonable man or person standard." As one scholar
notes, the dissent to the Sixth Circuit's majority opinion in
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co."' depicted the reasonable wom-
an standard as "a neutral construct" that "itself will determine
whether a particular woman's complaint is legitimate. 11 4 As the
following discussion demonstrates, this neutrality is somewhat il-
lusory. Judge Keith's dissent in Rabidue highlights the most prob-
lematic aspect of the reasonable woman standard: A reasonable
woman is difficult to define. "[T]he dissenter views the reasonable
woman test as distinguishing between regulable 'neurotic' women
and protected 'reasonable' women. And just as the majority uses
consensus as the neutral mediator between diversity and conformi-
ty, so the dissent uses consensus among women as a similar media-
tor., ,1 5
Over the years, a substantial amount of criticism has been
directed at both the historical and the modem women's move-
ments for being predominantly white and upper-middle class and
for having a predominantly white, upper-middle-class agenda. 16
Critics may argue legitimately that, in its application, any reason-
able woman standard will inevitably reflect this white, upper-mid-
dle-class bias and, therefore, produce a skewed understanding of
what women, as a gioup, identify as offensive sexual conduct. Be-
112. See Ehrenreich, supra note 80, 1215-19. Ehrenreich illustrates some of the draw-
backs of a reasonable woman standard; but most of these drawbacks stem from problems
with reasonableness as much as they do from "womanness."
113. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
114. Ehrenreich, supra note 80, at 1216-17.
115. Id. at 1217. It is the viability of this group-wide consensus that many women
reject. Imagine the following group of women discussing sexual harassment at a round-
table discussion: Gloria Steinem, Camille Paglia, Anita Bryant, Catharine MacKinnon,
Sandra Day O'Connor, and Marilyn Quayle. It is possible that this particular group of
women would never reach a consensus. One member of the group would clearly object
to an opposing member's viewpoint being labelled as the "reasonable" woman's perspec-
tive. Expecting a woman to be able to speak on behalf of all women simply by virtue of
her sex is subject to criticism as an essentialist position.
116. A current example of this bias can be seen in the "Pro-Choice" movement. The
main emphasis of the women's movement in the area of abortion has been the freedom
of a woman to make decisions concerning her own body and the inappropriateness of the
current role of government in that decision. Unfortunately, for many poor, young, and/or
minority women, government involvement in the form of federal funding is exactly what
is needed to enable their freedom to choose.
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cause more educated women tend to identify more types of sexual
conduct in the workplace as sexually harassing, 7 critics may ar-
gue that the use of a more highly educated woman as the standard
would produce an unrepresentative number, i.e., too large a num-
ber, of successful cases.118
To lobby for certain legal reforms in the past, such as suffrage
and reproductive rights, women have needed to promote an image
of themselves as a group. In essence, women have had to respond
as a group because they have been discriminated against in many
capacities as a group. From the colonial period through the early
twentieth century, women as a group were perceived by men as
incompetent to handle the responsibility of voting."9 At other
times women as a group have been perceived as incompetent to
have sole custody of their children1" or to practice law.' Re-
117. Pollack also notes that "reports of sexual harassment increase with a woman's
level of education, not only because these women are more likely to be in nontraditional
jobs, but also because they define more types of behavior as harassing." Pollack, supra
note 4, at 52 n.55 (citing Martin, supra note 107, at 59-60).
118. The danger that the "reasonable" woman would be equated with the most edu-
cated woman is unlikely. Highly educated women are a minority among women in the
work force. See supra note 47. A more realistic danger is that these women, because of
their minority status, will be considered unreasonable.
119. In a letter to James Sullivan, dated May 26, 1776, John Adams emphasizes the
inadvisability of opening to question the voting qualifications of men without property:
[lit is dangerous to open so fruitful a source of controversy and altercation as
would be opened by attempting to alter the qualifications of voters; there will
be no end of it. New claims will arise; women will demand a vote . . .. It
tends to confound and destroy all distinctions, and prostrate all ranks to one
common level.
Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), reprinted in THE FEMINIST
PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 13, 15 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1973). Of women,
children and men without property, Adams theorized that these are "too little acquainted
with public affairs to form a right judgment, and too dependent upon other men to have
a will of their own[.]" Id. at 14. Women, in particular, are unfit for other reasons as
well:
[T]heir delicacy renders them unfit for practice and experience in the great
businesses of life, and the hardy enterprises of war, as well as the arduous
cares-of state. Besides, their attention is so much engaged with the necessary
nurture of their children, that nature has made them fittest for domestic cares.
Id at 13-14. Fortunately, by 1920, 144 years later, women were able to work free of
some of these debilitating beliefs.
120. See generally PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHIL-
DREN AND CUSTODY (1986); FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 491-92 (Ira M.
Ellman et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
121. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in judgment,
joined by Field and Swayne, JJ.) (upholding law forbidding women to practice law in
light of "their natural and proper timidity" unfitting women for "many of the occupations
of civil life").
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form movements engineered to gain certain rights for all women
also had the effect of putting all women in one group-the peti-
tioners, or, alternatively, the victims of oppression.
Women's identity as a group then, often utilized in legal fora
and in reform efforts, has operated to obscure the individual iden-
tities of women and the vast differences among women. Within the
context of the women's movement and at times characterized by
agitation for various women's rights, questions like "Well Ms. X,
what do women think about ... ?" have become increasingly
common. This phenomenon was readily apparent during Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas's confirmation hearings. The
nation's attention turned very briefly to the way women perceived
harassment. Reporters and interviewers, however, obtained very
different responses from Phyllis Schlafly than from Molly Yard
and Catharine MacKinnon.' Women from all over the United
States demonstrated their vast diversity of opinion on the subject
by calling television news programs with comments ranging from,
"Well, even if he did do all those things she said he did, that's not
really harassment" to "If a man asks a woman out after she has
said 'no' once, that constitutes sexual harassment." The vastly
different perspectives among women about sexual conduct in the
workplace highlight the problems judges may have in discerning
the reasonable or representative perspective necessary to apply the
reasonable woman standard.
Another definitional problem posed by the reasonable woman
standard concerns its apparent exclusion of men from the class of
sexual harassment victims. It is necessary to consider the implica-
tions of this standard and its apparent corollary, the reasonable
man standard, for male victims. In his dissent in Ellison v.
Brady,"z ' Judge Stephens made a useful point on this topic re-
garding the inadvisability of adopting a reasonable woman stan-
dard. First, while acknowledging women's predominance in the
122. "'The feminists always say they speak for women. They don't at all,' fumes
Phyllis Schlafly, president of Eagle Forum, a politically conservative group. 'They are like
Thelma and Louise. They want to lock the man in the trunk, throw out the keys, and
make it a day.'" Sonia L. Nazario, Views of "Women" Are as Varied as the Women,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1991, at B4. Nazario's article documents various polls that revealed
that women were divided over Anita Hill's sincerity and Justice Clarence Thomas's guilt.
Notable divisions fell along the lines of age, occupation, socio-economic status, and ideol-
ogy.
123. 924 F.2d 872, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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group of sexual harassment victims, he emphasized the fact that
men also experience harassment in the workplace. 24 A reason-
able woman standard would not benefit them, and might, in fact,
disadvantage them."z The reasonable woman standard is largely
a product of the recognition of gender-role stereotyping and its
effects on women. If men are held to the standard of the average
socialized man, characterized pervasively by the trappings of
American machismo, their claims of sexual harassment will not be
successful. Certainly, men who experience sexual harassment
should be able to bring a claim and have the benefit of a standard
that can accommodate men who do not conform to the gender
stereotype of the typical, red-blooded American male.
Judge Stephens suggested, among other things, a "victim"
standard as an alternative "more in line with a gender neutral ap-
proach.""a The Ellison majority, repeatedly referring to the stan-
dard as that of the reasonable woman, undoubtedly did so because
it perceived accurately that most victims are women. The majority
probably would not have had difficulty adopting Judge Stephens's
"victim" terminology, but would not have agreed that gender-neu-
trality is a good thing. Although the "victim" terminology is a
positive change in that men can benefit from the protection it
affords, the idea that gender is irrelevant to the analysis is exactly
what the Ellison majority tried to dispel: "We adopt the perspec-
tive of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a
sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and
tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women."1" The
tension is apparent. An attempt to eradicate the negative effects of
gender-stereotyping on women by encouraging an explicit focus on
124. Id. at 884.
125. Judge Beezer, writing for the majority, argued that the "reasonable woman stan-
dard does not establish a higher level of protection for women than men." Id. at 879.
However, a gender-socialization analysis consistent with that which recommends the rea-
sonable woman standard may, in fact, suggest that men would receive less protection
characterized as "men" than they would as "victims." In Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630 (6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit adopted the reasonable woman standard. The
court's acknowledgement that men and women are vulnerable to sexual harassment in
different ways and are offended by different behavior could be read to suggest that men
are less vulnerable and less susceptible to offense. Applying a "reasonable man" standard
to male victims of harassment in this context may make it extremely difficult for a male
plaintiff to prevail if he is unlike the average, heterosexual American male. See supra
note 87.
126. Id. at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 879.
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what "real women" really think runs the risk of subjecting male
victims to equally debilitating gender-stereotyping by imposing on
these plaintiffs a standard based on what "real men" really think.
Just as the educated woman may stand to lose by application of a
reasonable woman standard, a nonconformist man stands to lose
from its necessary corollary, the standard of reasonableness de-
signed exclusively for men in harassment situations.
B. Theoretical Drawbacks
1. A Separate Standard Based on the "Reasonableness" of
Women as Distinct from Men Is Inherently Marginalizing. In light
of the vast diversity among women, and the danger of assigning a
uniform viewpoint to all women on the basis of their membership
in the group "women," the reasonable woman standard may not
be the most effective way to solve the problems it proposes to
solve. The definitional drawbacks of the reasonable woman stan-
dard outlined above expose the danger of defining women as a
subset of humanity with understandings of reasonableness inherent-
ly different from those of men. Although the reasonable woman
standard seems useful precisely because of differences between
men and women created largely by gender-role socialization, estab-
lishing a reasonable woman in the law ultimately may have a
marginalizing effect:
[S]ubstituting a reasonable woman standard to-judge the conduct
of women, but not going further to question the inclusiveness of
norms informing the reasonable person standard, implies that
women's experiences and reactions are something for women
only, rather than normal human responses. Since women are a
significant proportion of persons, their experiences should count
as the experiences of a reasonable person, not merely as the
experiences of a reasonable woman.s2
Whether a reasonable woman and a reasonable person standard
can coexist is a useful inquiry." 9 This juxtaposition implies that
women are somehow not persons, a dichotomy that the law should
128. Finley, supra note 8, at 64.
129. In situations concerning sexual harassment victims, the correlative standard for
men may be the reasonable man standard as opposed to the more commonly used rea-




not establish. This observation provides support for those who
believe that the reasonable person standard should be maintained
and that the Rabidue court, on the facts presented, made an aber-
rant, unreasonable decision. According to this reasoning, the ineq-
uitable result produced by the Rabidue court should not be the
motivating factor for the abandonment of a neutral, reasonable
person standard.
The reasonable person standard has, after all, produced results
more equitable to the plaintiff in other cases. The Fifth Circuit in
Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp."3 used the reasonable person
standard; although granting defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment on other grounds, the court held that obscene cartoons de-
picting the plaintiff involved in crude and deviant sexual activities
posted on the wall of the public men's room of the office building
certainly constituted harassment based on sex."'
Any reasonable person would have to regard these cartoons as
highly offensive to a woman who seeks to deal with her fellow
employees and clients with professional dignity and without the
barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse. This is a perfect ma-
trix to grow the hostile environment subjecting a woman to the
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult which Title VII
protects against1 2
The language of this decision indicates that the reasonable person
standard can be applied in a way that is sensitive to a woman's
particular concerns within her working environment that may be
very different from those of a man. Proponents of the reasonable
woman standard would argue, however, that the level of sensitivity
displayed by the Bennett court is highly unusual and that the rea-
sonable person standard generally has a much higher margin for
error than does the reasonable woman standard. 33
130. 845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
131. Id. at 105-06.
132. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
133. Of the cases using the reasonable person standard, more have had negative re-
sults for the plaintiff than have had positive, and of cases using the reasonable woman
standard, more have had positive results for the plaintiff than have had negative-a fac-
tor weighing in favor of the-reasonable woman test. For reasonable person cases with
negative results, see Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213-15 (7th Cir. 1986);
Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 698 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), affd sub nom. LaRue v.
Brinias, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991); Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 715 F. Supp. 1496 (D.
Colo. 1987), afj'd, 878 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1989). For a case with positive analysis using
the reasonable woman's perspective, see Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d
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2. The Reification of Socialized Difference. The creation of
a reasonable woman as an entity distinct from the reasonable man
is also dangerous in that it may serve to reify and perpetuate
those differences that seem to be causing the perception problems
we are trying to solve. The reasonable woman standard developed
in reaction to apparent differences in the way men and women
perceive and are affected by sexual conduct in the workplace. If
one acknowledges that these differences are the product of social-
ization processes, one must also acknowledge that these kinds of
differences may be weakened or even eliminated through compet-
ing socialization processes that stress mutual humanity as opposed
to gendered stereotypes.
Establishing separate legal standards governing the behavior
and reasonableness of men and women is tantamount to accepting
the inevitability of the suggested differences between men and
women. This argument is structured primarily around the power of
language. As the language of the reasonable man standard had the
effect, at best, of marginalizing women and, at worst, of rendering
women legally invisible, so the language of the reasonable woman
standard has the power to perpetuate the problems it is designed
to resolve. If a judge is asked to consider explicitly the perspective
of a female plaintiff as a woman, eventually it will be understood
that certain things are reasonable for men and others for women.
The societally created difference, reified by way of a legal stan-
dard, may be perpetuated because of that standard.
Consider the following examples of ways in which language
can mold reality in this context. In his dissent in Ellison v.
Brady,"M Judge Stephens notes that the majority implicitly sug-
gests, by its adoption of a reasonable woman standard, that men
do not have the capacity to really understand women. He takes
issue with the majority's implication that men "do not have the
same sensibilities as women."135 He argues, reasonably, that men
104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989). For cases with positive results
using the reasonable woman standard, see Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1482-83 (3d Cir. 1990); Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283,
294-95 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Austen v. Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612, 628 (D. Haw. 1991), affd,
967 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1992); Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 664-65 (Mich. App.
1991), appeal granted, 487 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1992).
134. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
135. Id. at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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may be expected to understand women's situation with regard to
sexual harassment. If true, this argument militates in favor of the
reasonable person standard.1" Judge Stephens correctly points
out that separate standards may have the effect of dividing men
and women as opposed to bringing them to an understanding of
each other's perspectives.
Consider also the tendency of courts to use the terms "reason-
able woman" and "reasonable victim" interchangeably. This use of
language encourages the perception of women as victims. Although
the Ellison majority uses the terms "reasonable woman" and "rea-
sonable victim" interchangeably, Judge Stephens seems correct in
focusing on the "reasonable woman" terminology. The Ellison
majority is concerned with emphasizing the perception gap be-
tween men and women; thus the "woman" aspect of the standard
is paramount. Other courts that have adopted Ellison's stance also
use the "reasonable woman" terminology.137 Legal scholars have
written about the possibilities of reasonable woman and reasonable
victim standards for several years, and have tended, in their arti-
cles, to use the terms "woman" and "victim" interchangeably."
136. Ideally, although this assertion may be true, it does not lessen the significance of
the majority's argument that gender is a factor which needs to be recognized explicitly
because of the current differences between the socialization processes of men and women.
In making determinations about offensive and hostile environments, it will be useful for a
male judge to keep in mind that the ferale plaintiff he is considering may have had a
markedly different response to the alleged behavior than he, as a male, might have.
It is ironic that, in the same paragraph in which Judge Stephens argues for men's
ability to understand women, their circumstances, and concerns, he also argues that the
reasonable man standard traditionally means the average adult person. If the standard
means "person," it is curious that it does not say "person." Considering women's histori-
cal legal categorization with idiots and children, it is doubtful that traditional tort law
really expected the court to factor in the reasonableness of all adults.
Judge Stephens's last point in dissent is factually incorrect: He analogizes the focus
on the victim of sexual harassment to the focus placed by defense attorneys in rape trials
on the victim's conduct, id.; however, the proposed focus in sexual harassment cases is on
the victim's perspective, not on her conduct. A more appropriate analogy would be be-
tween a victim in a rape trial and a victim in a sexual harassment case governed by the
Meritor standard which allows investigation into the victim's manner of speech and dress
as a factor in assessment of "unwelcomeness" of alleged conduct. See supra text accom-
panying notes 56-63.
137. See Austen v. Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612, 628 (D. Haw. 1991), affd, 967 F.2d 583
(9th Cir. 1992); Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Mich. App. 1991), appeal
granted, 487 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1992).
138. See eg., Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 23, at 258 ("[IThe woman's 'reasonable'
view should control. Unfortunately, adopting the victim's viewpoint is inherently subjec-
tive . . . . The courts are, however, capable of reconciling the subjectivity of a victim's
view with a 'reasonable woman' standard."); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive
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"The proper perspective is the objective one of the reasonable vic-
tim .... By adopting the woman's point of view as the norm, the
courts might heighten male sensitivity to the effects of sexually
offensive conduct in the workplace.""" This tendency to use the
two terms interchangeably undoubtedly arises from the fact that
because most cases concern harassment of women, a reasonable
victim in these cases will be a woman. Considered separately, the
reasonable woman and the reasonable victim standards have very
different implications-the one focusing on gender, the other on
power. The language employed in either version of the revised
standards has evolved to address alleged differences in the way
men and women perceive sexual conduct. These differences are
arguably products of our socialization processes rather than our
biological processes. Accepting this assumption, there is potential
for societal change. As more and more women enter the
workplace, as fewer jobs are overwhelmingly male-dominated, and
as society's perceptions of women evolve, it is conceivable that this
perception gap may narrow of its own accord. The reasonable
woman standard offers a band-aid for the present problem, a
short-term solution. With any luck and a great deal of persever-
ance, a reasonable person standard might actually work in the
future if men and women are able to move beyond the particular
stage of gender-role stagnation existing today. Hopefully, the ratio-
nale currently supporting a reasonable woman standard will be
incomprehensible to future generations. The establishment of a
separate standard for women at this point in time, when women
are entering the paid work force in ever-increasing numbers, poses
a serious practical risk: The very existence of such a standard may
reinforce the very socialized differences we now seek to eradicate
and move beyond.
C. The Practical Arena.: The Use of the Reasonable Woman's Per-
spective Has Produced Negative Results
Although the Ninth Circuit illustrated that the reasonable
woman standard can be applied effectively, the reasonable
woman's perspective has been used in a manner the Ellison major-
ity did not consider explicitly. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1984).
139. Note, supra note 138, at 1459.
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Co.," the Sixth Circuit applied a reasonable person test.141
The Rabidue district court, however, had relied on the perspective
of "an "average female employee" to produce the reasoning on
which the Sixth Circuit, in turn, relied so heavily. The result ob-
tained by using this "average female employee" perspective is re-
markably detrimental to women's interests. The district court's
opinion," from which Judge Krupansky later borrowed much of
his stultifying language, offers a vivid example of the way in which
a reasonable woman standard can be used to eradicate the very
benefits the Ellison court envisioned.
The district court analyzed the facts of Rabidue under the
EEOC guidelines, which require harassing conduct to cause unrea-
sonable interference before it is actionable.4 The court noted
that the word "unreasonably" in section 1604.11(a)(3) gives the
court discretion to consider "the nature of the employment envi-
ronment... the educational background of the plaintiff's co-work-
ers and supervisors, the physical make up of the plaintiff's work
area, and the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff with respect
to the kind of conduct that constitutes sexual harassment."144 The
court evaluated each aspect of the claim separately and found that
the plaintiff did not state a case for interference with work perfor-
mance, intimidation, or hostility. As to interference with work
performance, "the court concluded that the vulgar language
["cunt," "pussy," "tits," "fat ass"] and sex oriented posters [explicit
pornography] did not interfere with plaintiff's work performance.
Plaintiff's work problems resulted from her temper and stubborn-
ness."1 4 As to intimidation, "[t]he Court believe[d] that plaintiff
was not at all fearful while employed at Osceola. The evidence
simply does not reflect that plaintiff ever felt fear on the job."' 46
Regarding hostility, the court opined that "[t]he language and
posters were not so drastic as to affect plaintiff's psychological
well-being. The evidence reflects that the co-worker's language was
annoying, but not so shocking or severe as to actually affect the
140. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
141. See supra Section III(A).
142. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 805 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
143. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991); see supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
144. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430.




psyches of female employees. Thus, the hostile environment theory
must be rejected."147 The highly subjective nature of these value
judgments made by the district court is painfully obvious, regard-
less of the "evidence" (never explicitly described) that allegedly
supported its conclusions.
Acknowledging that the word "offensive" may encompass a
greater spectrum of behavior than the word "hostile," the court
also stated that the plaintiff had not met even this low threshold.
The court proceeded to forge its own "objective" test for an offen-
sive work environment:
[A]n offensive work environment is created where.., the com-
plained of conduct is so significant a factor that the average
female employee finds that her overall work experience is sub-
stantially and adversely affected by the conduct. Under this stan-
dard the sexual harassment need not be psychologically disabling.
On the other hand, trivial and merely annoying vulgarity would
not constitute sex harassment.14
As illustrated by the district court's opinion in Rabidue, the
reasonable woman test and the elicitation of the woman's point of
view are not invincible tools. They do not promise a satisfying or
necessarily "reasonable" outcome. Regarding "offensiveness," the
district court once again found that the plaintiff had not made out
a case: "[P]laintiff's overall work experience was not substantially
affected by Mr. Henry's vulgarity. Instead, the vulgarity merely
constituted an annoying-but fairly insignificant-part of the total
job environment."'49 Even considering the pornographic posters
along with the excessive vulgarity, the court still did not perceive
the "offensiveness" of the environment. The most frightening as-
pect of this case, a fundamental feature that is mirrored by the
Sixth Circuit's ensuing opinion, is the willingness of the court to
extrapolate a standard of offensiveness applicable to the work
environment from the societal status quo. The convoluted reason-
147. Id.
148. Id. at 433 (emphasis added). Once again, it is important to notice that the court
determined the case by forging its own interpretation of what a reasonable woman (aver-
age female employee) would find trivial or merely annoying. This interpretive process
cannot be overemphasized; it is during this process that the very different perceptions of




big applied by this court can only be conveyed by its own reveal-
ing language.
No evidence was offered indicating that plaintiff has any especial
sensitivity to erotic pictures. Furthermore, as the Court has men-
tioned, the subsection 3 standard pertains to the average female
employee. In other words, the test is an objective one.
For better or worse, modem America features open displays
of written and pictorial erotica. Shopping centers, candy stores
and prime time television regularly display pictures of naked
bodies and erotic real or simulated sex acts. Living in this milieu,
the average American should not be legally offended by sexually
explicit posters.
The Court finds that the posters had a de minimis effect on
plaintiff's work environment .... [T]he Court concludes that
Mr. Henry's vulgar language combined with the sexually explicit
posters was not enough to make plaintiff's working environment
offensive under 29 CFR sec. 1604.11(a)(3).m°
Although the district court acknowledges the relevance of the
view of the "average female employee" in the first quoted para-
graph, it replaces this language with the term "the average Ameri-
can" in the second quoted paragraph; consequently, the distinction
between these two theoretically discrete entities is elided. The
district court's attempt to use an objective female viewpoint, and
the Sixth Circuit's subsequent affirmance of the disastrous result,
militate against the adoption of a reasonable woman standard. The
susceptibility of the reasonable woman to views that are more
culturally masculine demands a careful evaluation of this proposed
legal reform. The district court's opinion validates the following
observation: "Even a reasonable woman standard, when it is not
carefully elaborated by a discussion of the differences between
men and women, may reflect less an effort to see beyond the male
perspective, than an attempt to evoke a woman who is, in Henry
Higgins's words, 'more like a man.' 151 The district court's use of
150. Id. Note the paradoxical situation in which the court placed the plaintiff. The
court stated that no evidence was offered indicating a special sensitivity to pornography.
This standard is supposed to be an objective one. The average person, according to the
second quoted paragraph, should not be offended by pornography. Notice that, even if
Vivienne Rabidue could have presented evidence supporting the fact that she was person-
ally offended, she could not recover because she then would have been the rare hyper-
sensitive employee. By uncritically using societal norms as a standard of evaluation, the
court placed Rabidue in a no-win situation.
151. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1201.
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the reasonable woman standard produced the exact same results as
the Sixth Circuit's use of the reasonable person standard in
Rabidue. This misdirected use of the reasonable woman standard
suggests that the problem is not in the standard's terminology, but
in the perspective of the persons applying the standard. In any
case, the Rabidue district court decision demonstrates that the
reasonable woman standard is susceptible to debilitating applica-
tion in much the same way that the reasonable person standard is
susceptible.
The argument can be made that all standards employing a
reasonableness analysis will be susceptible to this type of debilitat-
ing application in that particular applications will undoubtedly
reflect the bias of the persons charged with applying the stan-
dards."5 2 Although there is truth to this criticism, it does not di-
minish the significance of the argument that there are several
problems with the reasonable woman standard, as illustrated in
this Part. It is the particular combination of problems inherent in
the reasonable woman standard that makes the proposed standard
an ineffective, potentially harmful reform. Imagine an inverted
triangle and place the reasonable person standard along the flat
surface at the top of the figure. As one progresses downward to
the point of the triangle, the reasonable woman standard may be
placed in the middle of the figure and the reasonable victim stan-
dard at the bottom. This figure visually represents the discretion a
judge has to impose his personal perceptions and biases while
applying each of these standards. A decisionmaker's discretion de-
creases as the focus on the individual plaintiff's perception is
sharpened. The "gender-neutral" reasonable person terminology in-
volves the greatest margin for error because neutral language
makes it easier to ignore the illuminating perception difference
that the reasonable woman standard highlights."5 3 The reasonable
152. The reasonable victim standard offered as an alternative solution in Part V poses
this problem, though it does so to a lesser degree.
153. For a comparison of positive and negative results produced by the application of
both the reasonable person and reasonable woman standards, see supra note 133. The
Rabidue district court decision is the only case available purporting to use a reasonable
woman standard that ends so disastrously for the plaintiff. EEOC v. Blue Diamond
Growers Assoc., No. 90-2281, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 910 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 1992), -affd
without op., 980 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1992) (plaintiff loses motion for summary judgment
after application of reasonable woman standard); see also Djallah v. East Bay Mun. Util.
Dist., No. C-90-2853-JPV, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15913 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1991) (using
reasonable woman standard finding that events described by plaintiff do not support
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victim terminology presents a similar problem of susceptibility to
bias, but it is narrower in scope. Further, because this standard
employs the victim terminology, it entails neither the practical
consequences of the theoretical problems of marginalization and
reification of difference nor the definitional quandary posed by the
reasonable woman standard.
V. THE BEST ALTERNATIVE:
THE REASONABLE VICTIM STANDARD
Adopting a reasonable victim standard with an explicit gender
analysis as a relevant and necessary element of the case evaluation
would solve many of the concerns of both the reasonable person
and the reasonable woman proponents. Although scholars who
have suggested the reasonable victim standard have often argued
alternatively that the woman's view should control, thereby
conflating the two standards,1" the reasons they offer in support
of the reasonable victim standard are sound. The offensiveness of
the conduct should be evaluated from the viewpoint of the "rea-
sonable victim." The reasonable victim standard, while objective in
its insistence on reasonableness, is slightly subjectified by the vic-
tim aspect of the standard, which draws the attention of judges to
the power differential implicit in the relationship of the parties in-
volved. The power dynamics analyzed in this relationship can
include the male/female relationship as well as the employ-
er/employee relationship. 55 The objective aspect of the standard
embodied by the "reasonableness" language will protect defendants
from hypersensitive plaintiffs. Of course, this framing of the stan-
dard does not eliminate the problems encountered when courts too
quickly characterize complainants as hypersensitive, but the added
prong requiring evaluation of gender implications will help allevi-
finding of sexually hostile work environment).
154. See, eg., Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 23, at 257-58; Note, supra note 138, at
1459.
155. This standard can also encompass the less common cases, such as the male em-
ployee harassed by a female supervisor, or a female employee harassed by a male em-
ployee who, though not her subordinate, occupies a lower position on the corporate lad.
der. It would also apply to cases of same-sex harassment. The power differential in these
situations is concededly less than and substantially different from the prototypical case in
which the male supervisor harasses a female employee whom he has the ability to hire,




ate this situation. Attention to the gender of the victim can protect
female victims from behavior that men may not view as offensive,
by allowing for recognition as offensive or hostile behavior that
the average American male, i.e., the reasonable person, may not
view as such.
"Adoption of the reasonable victim standard of assessing
offensiveness should help remove sexual stereotypes from the legal
system."' 6 Removing the focus from sexual stereotypes is an im-
portant benefit of the "reasonable victim" terminology. The rea-
sonable woman standard has the tendency to encourage generaliza-
tions about women as a group that may be detrimental to an
individual woman's case..The dynamics of group oppression should
be integral to any sexual harassment analysis under Title VII but
should not obscure the analysis as to the harm inflicted on the
individual plaintiff as a specific victim. Emphasizing power, the
terminology of the reasonable victim standard does not focus on
gender as the primary criterion of evaluation. This simple change
will retard the ease of generalization about what women as a
group think and feel, allowing courts to address the situation of
the individual woman in the context of her particular working
environment. However, the explicit gender analysis prescribed by
this standard will prevent courts from ignoring or overlooking
those differences in perception apparent between men and women
at this time in our society.
Furthermore, the use of the term "gender" as opposed to
"woman" in the language of the suggested standard encourages a
recognition that the apparent differences between men and women
are the products of socialization rather than biology, and conse-
quently susceptible to change. A focus on gender in addition to
sex will help move us away from the essentializing aspects of the
reasonable woman standard. Gender is not always aligned with
sex. For example, a woman can have masculine gendered charac-
teristics and a man may have feminine gendered characteristics;
both may be discriminated or harassed for these very reasons.
Acknowledgement of this reality will also move judges away from
the tendency to essentialize women. Although the label "woman"
is readily and accurately assigned to a biological female, the gen-
der "feminine" is not as easy to assign. The entire focus of the
156. Holzman & Trelz, supra note 23, at 258.
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case will be on circumstances affecting the particular individual:
the power dynamic giving rise to the harassment situation; the
victim's sex; and the gendered characteristics of the plaintiff that
may have added to the offensiveness or hostility experienced by
that plaintiff.
Although any objective consensus on what is or is not appro-
priate sexual conduct in the workplace is impossible in light of the
vastly differing perceptions of men and women today, these differ-
ences are a product of socialization processes that can be modified
over time. As more women enter the work force at all levels, and
the power differential between men and women as societal groups
is minimized, a more rational and mutual understanding of appro-
priate conduct in the workplace will evolve. A reasonable victim
standard could readily adapt to this evolution, whereas a reason-
able woman standard, by explicitly suggesting that women are
somehow fundamentally, unchangeably different from men, mili-
tates through its language against the very evolution we hope will
take place. This argument is largely semantic, but the language
used to frame the analysis can have a great impact on the substan-
tive evaluation of sexual harassment cases.
The thoughtful analysis undertaken by the Ninth Circuit in
Ellison v. Brady' would not change very much under the pro-
posed standard. The only difference would be the definitive adop-
tion of a reasonable victim standard requiring an explicit evalua-
tion of gender. The language chosen to implement substantive
changes in sexual harassment law may have long-term effects not
yet contemplated by the progressive and openminded Ninth Cir-
cuit. These consequences warrant the thoughtful consideration of
the proposed version of the reasonable victim standard.
157. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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